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Abstract  
We empirically investigate the impact of shareholders' excess control rights (greater control 
than cash-flow rights) on bank profitability and risk before, during, and after the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. We use a unique hand-crafted dataset tracing the complete 
control chains of 788 European commercial banks and cover the 2002-2010 period. We find 
that the presence of excess control rights is associated with lower profitability, higher risk-
taking and higher default risk before (2002-2006) and after (2009-2010) the crisis. 
Conversely, it improves profitability and no longer affects risk during the crisis (2007-2008). 
Further evidence shows that, regardless of the period, the effect of excess control rights on 
profitability and risk is accentuated in family-controlled banks and in countries with relatively 
weak shareholder protection rights and that such an effect is only effective at intermediate and 
high levels of excess control rights. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature 
examining the corporate governance determinants of banks' performance during the 2007-
2008 financial crisis and have several policy implications. 
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1. Introduction  
Weak corporate governance in the banking industry has often been considered as one of the 
causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. As such, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BIS, 2010a) has called for better governance mechanisms within financial 
institutions. Although a large number of banks failed or were rescued during the crisis, some 
banks performed worse than others. Various papers have investigated the factors behind such 
cross-variation in bank performance and some works (e.g., Gropp and Köhler, 2010; 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Aebi et al., 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Berger et al., 2012; 
Erkens et al., 2012) have specifically examined the role played by corporate governance (e.g., 
manager compensation schemes, board structure, ownership concentration). In this paper, we 
investigate whether the presence of controlling shareholders with greater control rights than 
cash-flow rights in pyramidal ownership structures -who play a major role in the European 
banking industry- affects bank profitability and risk differently during normal times and 
distress times.  
The corporate governance literature argues that the presence of controlling shareholders can 
be either good or bad for minority shareholders and the firm's performance. On the positive 
side (incentives view), the presence of controlling shareholders mitigates the standard owner–
manager agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) because of their ability and incentives 
to monitor managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 1997). On the negative side (entrenchment 
view), controlling shareholders may pursue their own interests and distort management 
decision-making leading to insider expropriation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).1 In the extant 
literature (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010; Lin et al., 2011), the 
likelihood of expropriation and tunneling is generally measured by the divergence between 
control or voting rights (the right to vote and therefore to control) and cash-flow rights (the 
right to receive dividends) in pyramids, namely referred to as excess control rights.  
While the divergence between control and cash-flow rights is found to negatively impact 
firm value and performance in general (Claessens et al., 2002) and bank profitability more 
specifically (Azofra and Santamaría, 2011),2 how it affects shareholder behavior and 
                                                           
1
 Expropriation can take several forms. For example, entrenched controlling shareholders can tunnel (divert) 
resources from a firm where they have lower financial interests to another firm where they hold substantial 
financial interests (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2003; Baek et al., 2004). Tunneling behavior can 
take several forms and mainly the form of related-lending (Laeven, 2001; La Porta et al., 2003; Beck et al., 
2003).    
2
 Azofra and Santamaría (2011) study Spanish commercial banks during the 1996-2004 sound period and find 
that a divergence between control and cash-flow rights negatively impacts their profitability.     
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2311738 
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profitability but also risk-taking and default risk during times of distress remains an open 
question. On the one hand, firms controlled by entrenched shareholders could suffer from 
sharper declines in profitability during bad times. Consistent with the expropriation view 
(Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 2002; Baek et al., 2004), entrenched controlling shareholders 
might have even stronger incentives to divert resources for their own benefits during bad 
times to compensate the losses (or lower returns) they might be enduring in their other firms. 
Moreover, while investors and market participants might pay less attention to weak 
governance when the economy is doing well, they are likely to take it more into consideration 
during a crisis and might pull out from the firm leading to poorer performance (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998). On the other hand, according to the propping up view (Friedman et al., 
2003), firms controlled by entrenched shareholders might endure lower declines in 
profitability if they benefit from private funds from their shareholders who are keen on 
redistributing resources among all the entities they control (pyramidal ownership structure) to 
prevent all the firms from financial distress. From the profit-sharing view (among all the 
controlled firms), keeping the firm in business is important because it increases the 
expectations of future expropriation opportunities (e.g., providing support for connected-
firms). In any case, propping up behavior makes firms suffer less during a crisis period 
(Friedman et al., 2003).  
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 provides a natural experiment that allows us to investigate 
the effect of excess control rights on bank performance (profitability and risk) during sound 
and distress periods. Investigating such a relationship across crisis and sound periods for 
banks is of particular interest because such behaviors (expropriation or propping up) might be 
exacerbated or attenuated in the banking industry given its unique features. During a sound 
period, expropriation might be easier in banks because they are considered as more opaque 
than other firms and their assets are more complex (Morgan, 2002). For instance, entrenched 
controlling shareholders can push banks to lend at favorable conditions to other related-firms 
where they have considerable financial interests (La Porta et al., 2003). During a distress 
period, expropriation might more likely occur than propping up because banks benefit from 
safety nets and public support (deposit insurance, bail-out policies and government 
intervention). Furthermore, during downturns, banks generally reduce their lending (e.g, 
Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010) but might extend it (or reduce it but to a lesser extent) to their 
shareholders' related-firms than to other firms to support them. However, during a financial 
crisis, more stringent regulatory oversight and stronger market discipline might also mitigate 
entrenchment and opportunistic behavior more strongly in banks than other firms. Also, 
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bankruptcy costs could be higher for banks related to other firms within a pyramid. If such 
banks fail, related-firms would need to borrow from other banks at possibly less favorable 
conditions increasing the overall cost of funding for the pyramid. Hence, just like non-
financial firms, banks controlled by entrenched shareholders in pyramids might also benefit 
from the support of related-firms (propping up behavior) but such a support might even be 
more pronounced for banks than for non-financial firms. Consequently, banks controlled by 
shareholders with excess control rights might possibly outperform other banks during a crisis.  
Specifically, in this paper we use a unique hand-crafted sample with detailed ownership 
information on 788 commercial banks based in 17 Western European countries3 over 2002-
2010 which covers the pre-crisis (2002-2006), the crisis (2007-2008) and the post-crisis 
(2009-2010) periods to explore the effect of excess control rights on bank profitability and 
risk over the three periods.    
We control for various factors and, in line with the entrenchment view, find excess control 
rights to be negatively associated with bank profitability and positively linked with risk-taking 
and default risk before the crisis. However, during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, consistent 
with the propping up view, the impact of excess control rights on profitability becomes 
positive and it is no longer significant regarding risk-taking and default risk. Nevertheless, 
such a reversed impact is short-lived because after the crisis (2009-2010), excess control 
rights are again negatively linked with profitability and positively with default risk.  
We go further in our investigation by considering the factors that might influence the 
relationship between excess control rights and bank profitability and risk. Specifically, we 
consider the effect of family ownership and the level of shareholder protection rights since the 
incentives and the likelihood of expropriation are known to be higher in family-controlled 
firms (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and in countries with weak 
shareholder protection rights (La Porta et al., 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Consistent 
with such predictions, we find that, regardless of the state of the economy, the effect of excess 
control rights on profitability and risk is stronger in family-controlled banks and in 
shareholder less protective countries. Particularly, family-controlled banks and banks located 
in countries with weak shareholder protection which are found to have poorer performance 
(lower profitability and higher risk-taking and default risk) before the crisis are also the ones 
with higher profitability and lower earnings volatility during the crisis. We also investigate 
                                                           
3
 We focus on European countries where the presence of excess control rights is more acute compared to other 
countries, for instance, the U.S. (La Porta et al., 1998). 
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the effect of excess control rights on the changes in individual and industry-adjusted bank 
profitability. We find that, during the crisis, excess control rights contribute to improve the 
performance of banks compared to their past performance but also to their past performance 
relatively to their peers. For deeper insights, we further examine whether the shareholder’s 
entrenchment behavior depends on the extent of excess control rights since the relationship 
between ownership and firm performance is known to be nonlinear (Morck et al., 1988; 
Adams and Santos, 2006). Consistent with this conjecture, we find that, irrespective of the 
state of the economy, the effect of excess control rights on bank performance is essentially 
effective at intermediate and high levels of excess control rights.  
This paper extends the literature in several directions. First, our study focuses on whether 
bank profitability and risk are impacted by shareholders' excess control rights during distress 
periods. Unlike studies on nonfinancial firms (Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 2002; Baek et al., 
2004; Bae et al., 2012), we find banks controlled by shareholders with excess control rights to 
be more resilient to shocks. Also, this paper adds to the growing body of literature which 
investigates whether the cross-variation in banks’ performance during the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis can be explained by corporate governance mechanisms (Gropp and Köhler, 2010; 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Aebi et al., 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Berger et al., 2012; 
Erkens et al., 2012). While these studies have mainly focused on owner-manager conflicts of 
interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), in our work we consider the conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders in complex pyramidal ownership structures (La Porta et 
al., 1998) and find that ownership structure and control do matter in explaining cross-
variation in profitability and risk. In our work, we concomitantly consider the pre-crisis, crisis 
and post-crisis periods and shed light on whether a different influence of excess control rights 
on profitability and risk during the crisis is more or less persistent. Second, instead of 
investigating the impact of the divergence between control and cash-flow rights on 
profitability per se (as in Azofra and Santamaría, 2011 who study Spanish banks before the 
crisis), we also consider  implications on bank risk-taking and stability. Moreover, we go 
beyond by looking at the type of controlling owners (e.g., family, state, firm, bank, 
institutional investors) and account for the level of shareholder protection in different 
European countries. Finally, unlike studies on pyramidal ownership structure (see, e.g., La 
Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002 for nonfinancial firms and 
Caprio et al., 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2009 for banking firms) which mainly consider the 
largest publicly traded corporations at a given point in time, we collect a larger database 
including large and small banks, both publicly traded and privately owned and account for 
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changes in ownership structure through time.4 Our results are consistent with the concerns of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 2010a) regarding corporate governance 
within complex ownership structures and recommending further disclosure of banking 
entities’ ownership.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and the 
empirical method. Section 3 presents the sample characteristics and some univariate analysis. 
In Section 4, we discuss the econometric results. Section 5 reports the robustness checks and 
Section 6 concludes the paper.    
2. Data and method  
In this section, before presenting the empirical approach and our set of variables, we 
describe our sample.   
2.1. Sample  
Our study focuses on commercial banks based in 17 Western European countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) during 
the 2002-2010 period which covers the pre-crisis (2002-2006), the crisis (2007-2008) and the 
recovery (2009-2010) periods.5 Bank level accounting data are retrieved from BvD 
BankScope. For each bank, we use unconsolidated data if available; otherwise we use 
consolidated statements.6 To collect ownership information of the sampled banks, we use 
BankScope and Amadeus databases -as primary sources- together with annual reports. We 
also use World Bank Database to collect country-level and macroeconomic variables. For the 
time period and countries covered by this study, we identify 952 commercial banks for which 
we have detailed information on ownership structure and at least three subsequent years of 
time series observations.7 To minimize the effect of outliers, we remove 164 banks by 
eliminating extreme observations (2.5% lowest and highest values) for each financial variable 
of interest. We hence end up with a final sample of 4,451 bank-year observations 
                                                           
4
 Azofra and Santamaría (2011) also consider publicly traded and privately owned banks in their database and 
account for the time dimension of ownership structure but they focus on a single country (Spain) before the crisis 
period (1996-2004). In their work, they look at bank profitability but not at bank risk-taking and bank solvency.   
5
 We follow the definition provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS, 2010b) and define the 2-year 
window 2007-2008 as the acute crisis years and the 2009-2010 as our post-crisis/recovery period.  
6
 Our empirical analysis relies to a large extent on unconsolidated bank statements. In some cases, BankScope 
provides information only for consolidated data. We check the robustness of our results using unconsolidated 
data solely. 
7
 This criterion enables us to compute rolling-window means and standard deviations of our performance 
indicators (profitability and risk). 
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corresponding to 788 commercial banks, 132 of which are listed. Table 1 reports a breakdown 
of the sample by country and shows its representativeness by comparing the aggregate total 
assets of the sample banks in a given country with the aggregate assets of all the banks 
covered by BankScope in the same country. On average, the final sample covers, as a whole, 
more than 79% of total bank assets in the considered countries and at least 40% of total bank 
assets in each country.    
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
2.2. Method and variables    
We aim to investigate the effect of excess control rights on bank profitability and risk and 
more specifically how this effect differs according to the state of the economy. A crisis 
(shock) might affect the behavior of entrenched controlling shareholders more or less 
persistently. We therefore consider the pre-crisis and crisis periods but also the post-crisis 
(recovery) period. To capture differences in the effect of excess control rights on bank 
performance (profitability and risk) across these periods, we introduce two time binary 
variables which we group in the vector TDummy: a crisis dummy (Crisis) and a post-crisis 
dummy (PostCrisis) and we consider their interactions with the excess control rights variable 
(ExcessControl). The variables Crisis and PostCrisis take the value of one in 2007-2008 and 
2009-2010 respectively, and zero otherwise. We therefore estimate the following panel 
regression with bank-specific (X) and country-specific (Z) control variables:    
 
Y = α + α	Crisis + αPostCrisisExcessControl + δTDummy + φ′X + γ′Z + α% 
						+ε, 
(1) 
where Y is a measure of profitability or risk for bank i in year t; ExcessControl corresponds 
to excess control rights which is the difference between control and cash-flow rights;	ε is the 
error term.  
The parameters ), ) + )	 and ) + ) measure the effect of the shareholder’s excess 
control rights (ExcessControl) on bank profitability and risk during the pre-crisis (2002-
2006), the crisis (2007-2008) and the post-crisis (2009-2010) periods respectively.  
We now turn to the definitions of our dependent variable reflecting bank performance 
(profitability and risk), our ownership variable of interest (excess control rights) and the 
different control variables introduced in our regressions. The definition and descriptive 
statistics of all the variables used in our regressions are provided in Table 2.   
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2.2.1. Profitability, risk and default risk measures  
We measure profitability for each bank by computing the 3-year (from t-2 to t) rolling-
window mean of the return on average assets8 defined as the ratio of net income to average 
total assets (ROA).9   
We consider different measures of risk-taking and default risk which are all computed on 
the basis of 3-year rolling-window (from t-2 to t) using annual accounting data throughout the 
2002-2010 period. As a measure of bank risk-taking, we compute the 3-year rolling-window 
standard deviation of the return on average assets (SDROA). A higher standard deviation of 
the return on average assets indicates higher risk-taking. We also consider a proxy of default 
risk for each bank. We compute the Z-score (ZScore) as proposed by Boyd and Graham 
(1986). Lower values of ZScore indicate a higher probability of failure. For deeper insights, 
we also split ZScore into its two additive components Z1Score and Z2Score as in Goyeau and 
Tarazi (1992) and Lepetit et al. (2008). Z1Score is a measure of asset risk and Z2Score is a 
measure of leverage risk.10 Considering these two components allows us to capture the extent 
to which a change in default risk (ZScore) is driven by a change in leverage and/or in asset 
risk.   
2.2.2. Measuring excess control rights  
Our variable of interest is excess control rights which we define as the difference between 
control and cash-flow rights (ExcessControl). We obtain information on control and cash-
flow rights by tracing a complete control chain in a pyramidal structure at the control 
threshold11 of 10% for the years 2004 and 2006.12 To build these control chains, we first 
identify all the shareholders holding at least 10% of the shares of each bank by collecting data 
on direct ownership from BankScope (for the years 2004 and 2006) and complete it with 
information from annual reports. If the bank has at least one shareholder with 10% or more of 
                                                           
8
 We compute average assets at time t as: (total assets at time t + total assets at time t-1)/2.     
9
 We use the return on average assets (ROA) rather than the return on equity (ROE) because we are more 
concerned by banks' effectiveness in efficiently managing their assets in good and bad times than by their 
leverage (capital) which is severely impacted during a crisis.  
10
 ZScore = Z1Score + Z2Score = -./01-./+
	2345/78828	
01-./ , where equity/assets at time t is the 3-year rolling-
window mean of the ratio of total equity to total assets.     
11
 To build the control chains, we need to set a threshold (minimum percentage of shares held) to identify each 
owner inside the control chain. We follow previous studies on both banking firms (Caprio et al., 2007; Laeven 
and Levine, 2009) and nonfinancial firms (La Porta et al., 1999; Laeven and Levine, 2008) and we use a control 
threshold of 10% assuming that it provides a significant fraction of votes for effective control. As a robustness 
check, we also consider a 20% threshold.   
12
 We collect the data only for two years of the pre-crisis period because ownership structure is known to be 
relatively stable over time (La Porta et al., 1999; Laeven and Levine, 2009). Before 2004, Bankscope and 
Amadeus do not report information on the type of the shareholder (e.g., firm, bank, institutional investors).       
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total outstanding shares, we classify it as controlled; otherwise, it is classified as widely held. 
If some of these identified shareholders are not controlled by another shareholder (such as a 
family or a state), we consider them to be the ultimate controlling owners. If, however, some 
or all of these shareholders are themselves financial or nonfinancial corporations, we continue 
the process and build indirect control chains by identifying their owners, the owners of their 
owners until we reach ultimate shareholders.13 Since BankScope reports ownership 
information only for banks, we use the Amadeus database and annual reports (still 
considering data from 2004 and 2006) to gather ownership data on nonbanking firms that are 
shareholders at the intermediate levels of indirect control chains.  
Given the built control chain for each bank, we compute control rights, cash-flow rights and 
excess control rights using the method initially proposed by La Porta et al. (1999). We define 
the aggregate control rights (ControlRights) as the sum of direct and indirect control rights. 
Direct control rights are measured by the ultimate controlling shareholder’s stake directly held 
in the bank. Following La Porta et al. (1999), we define indirect control rights as the stake 
held in the first layer of the control chain. For example, if an entity A owns fraction c of 
corporation C, and this corporation C in turn owns fraction b of bank B, and both b and c are 
greater than the pre-defined 10% threshold, then the entity A’s indirect control rights in bank 
B are equal to b. If in addition to this indirect stake entity A owns a direct fraction d in bank 
B, then direct control rights are equal to d and the aggregate control rights are the sum of both 
stakes (d+b). Similarly, we measure the aggregate cash-flow rights (Cash-flowRights) of the 
ultimate controlling shareholder as the sum of direct and indirect cash-flow rights. Direct 
cash-flow rights are defined as direct ownership stakes held by the ultimate controlling 
shareholder in the bank. We define indirect cash-flow rights as the product of the ownership 
stakes held indirectly along the control chain. In the previous example, direct and indirect 
cash-flow rights of entity A in bank B are respectively equal to d and the product of b and c 
and its aggregate cash-flow rights are the sum of its direct (d) and indirect (b×c) stakes. When 
a bank is controlled by multiple ultimate owners, we define the ultimate controlling 
shareholder as the owner with the greatest control rights.14 When the bank is widely-held 
(there is no shareholder with at least 10% of control rights), we set aggregate control and 
cash-flow rights equal to zero. We finally define excess control rights as the difference 
                                                           
13
 Horizontally, the number of different ultimate controlling owners for a given bank in our sample reaches a 
maximum of nine. Vertically, the maximum number of intermediate levels required to build the indirect control 
chain until the ultimate owner is eight. 
14
 Over the 2002-2006 period, among the set of controlled banks in our sample, 525 are continuously classified 
as controlled by a single ultimate owner and 154 are continuously classified as controlled by multiple ultimate 
owners while 44 banks switch from one category to the other. 
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between control and cash-flow rights (ExcessControl=ControlRights-Cash-flowRights) as in 
La Porta et al. (1999).    
2.2.3. Control variables  
We include in our estimations a large set of control variables which are expected to affect 
bank profitability and risk. These variables capture individual bank characteristics (X) and 
also macroeconomic as well as institutional and regulatory factors at the country level (Z). 
2.2.3.1. Bank specific control variables  
We include the natural logarithm of bank total assets to account for bank size (Log(Assets)). 
The expected sign for the relationship between bank size and bank profitability is not clear-
cut. Larger banks may have higher profitability because they benefit from scale and scope 
economies and from higher market power (McAllister and McManus, 1993; Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou, 2007). However, larger banks may be less profitable than small banks because 
they are more complex and face higher agency costs (Berger et al., 1987). Similarly, the 
relationship between bank size and risk is also ambiguous. On the one hand, larger banks 
have greater ability to diversify their risk and should have more stable earnings and hence 
lower default risk (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). On the other hand, because of the presence of 
too-big-to-fail policies, larger banks might have higher incentives to take more risk (Galloway 
et al., 1997). The second control variable we include is the ratio of equity to total assets 
(Equity).15 The effect of bank capitalization on profitability is expected to be positive because 
better capitalized banks are able to raise funds at a lower cost (Bourke, 1989; Berger, 1995; 
Iannotta et al., 2007). While the effect of bank capitalization on default risk is expected to be 
negative, its effect on risk-taking is not clear. Banks with higher capital ratios are safer and 
take less risk (Keeley, 1990) but higher capital ratios due to more stringent capital regulation 
can encourage banks to take on more risk to maintain the expected return to shareholders 
(Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988). In such a case, a positive link 
would be expected between the ratio of equity to total assets and risk-taking (Iannotta, 2006; 
Barry et al., 2011). We also introduce the ratio of deposits to total assets (Deposits). While 
banks with higher deposits-to-assets ratio are expected to be more risky (Iannotta et al., 2007), 
the impact on profitability is uncertain. Banks with larger deposit base might be more 
                                                           
15
 Table A1 in the Appendix shows the correlation coefficients among the key explanatory variables used in our 
regressions. On the whole, the correlation coefficients are low except for bank size as measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets (Log(Assets)) and the ratio of equity to total assets (Equity). We hence orthogonalize 
Equity with respect to Log(Assets).    
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profitable because such funds are cheaper especially in the presence of deposit insurance 
(Iannotta et al., 2007; Gropp and Köhler, 2010). However, deposits are also costly in terms of 
fixed and labor costs (branching) possibly leading to lower profitability (Barry et al., 2011). 
We also include the ratio of total loans to total assets (Loans). A higher loans-to-assets ratio 
might lead to higher profitability if loans are more profitable than other assets ( Iannotta et al., 
2007). However, profitability can be lower because loans are more costly to produce than 
other assets and some of them become non-performing (Bourke, 1989; Molyneux and 
Thornton, 1992). Therefore, the overall effect depends on which effect dominates. Regarding 
risk, the impact is expected to be negative. Loans are usually more stable than non-traditional 
intermediation activities and contribute to lower earnings volatility and default risk (Iannotta 
et al., 2007). We control for differences in business models by including the ratio of net non-
interest income to net operating income (NNII). Income from non-traditional activities is 
expected to have a positive effect on profitability and risk. Overall, previous studies find that 
greater reliance on non-interest income activities is associated with higher risk and lower risk-
adjusted profitability (Stiroh, 2004; Lepetit et al., 2008). To account for operational 
efficiency, we use the cost-to-income ratio (CostIncomeRatio) which we expect to have a 
negative effect on bank profitability and a positive effect on risk (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 
Shehzad et al., 2010; Barry et al., 2011). We also include a dummy variable Listed to control 
for the public or private status of the bank. Publicly listed banks are expected to be more 
profitable but also more risky (Iannotta et al., 2007; Shehzad et al., 2010; Barry et al., 2011). 
During the 2007-2008 financial crisis, some of the banks in our sample benefitted from public 
support. To control for the influence of government interventions, and specifically capital 
injections, on profitability and risk we include a dummy variable Rescue which takes the 
value of one if the bank was rescued during the crisis, and zero otherwise (Petrovic and 
Tutsch 2009). Finally, we control for differences in ownership type (Barry et al., 2011) by 
including a set of dummy variables which reflect the type of the largest ultimate controlling 
shareholder: Bank, Family, State, Institutional, Industry and Foundation which respectively 
take the value of one if the largest ultimate controlling owner is a bank; an individual, a 
family or a manager;16 a state or a public authority; a financial company, an insurance 
company, a mutual or a pension fund; an industrial firm; and a foundation or a research 
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 Note that following La Porta et al. (1999), we classify a bank as family-controlled if the controlling 
shareholder is a person. We hence include inside this category banks controlled by an individual, a family or a 
manager.    
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institute.17  
2.2.3.2. Country specific variables  
We include the growth rate of the real gross domestic product (GDPGrowth) to control for 
differences in the macroeconomic environment. We expect a higher growth rate of GDP to be 
associated with higher profitability (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Iannotta et al., 2007; 
Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009) and lower risk (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Distinguin et al., 
2013). To capture the institutional environment, we use the index of shareholder protection 
(RightsProtection) as defined by Djankov et al. (2008). Higher values of the index indicate 
better protection of minority shareholders. Higher values of the index should be associated 
with higher profitability because in countries with strong shareholder protection, the interests 
of insiders (managers/controlling shareholders) are better aligned with those of minority 
shareholders who should less suffer from expropriation (Gropp and Köhler, 2010). 
Concomitantly, if the alignment hypothesis is not rejected, shareholders might push managers 
to take higher risk (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Gropp and Köhler, 2010). We hence expect 
banks located in countries with strong shareholder protection to be more risky. To control for 
the regulatory environment, we include two indexes: CapitalStringency and 
OfficialSupervisory.18 While CapitalStringency measures regulatory oversight on bank 
capital, OfficialSupervisory reflects the degree of supervisory authority power. Higher values 
of both indexes indicate respectively stronger regulatory oversight on capital and a more 
powerful supervisory authority. The effect of these regulatory variables on bank profitability 
and risk is ambiguous. Stronger capital oversight and the presence of a powerful supervisory 
authority should reduce risk-taking and enhance bank stability (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). As 
a consequence, expected profitability should be lower. However, in countries with stronger 
capital oversight and a powerful supervisory authority, banks may also take higher risk to 
compensate for the loss in utility (Laeven and Levine, 2009). In that case, these variables 
should be positively associated with both profitability and risk.     
3. Sample characteristics and univariate analysis 
In this section, we first present the broad characteristics of our sample of European banks. 
Then, using univariate mean tests we investigate the relationship between excess control 
rights and bank profitability and risk throughout the pre-crisis, the crisis and the post-crisis 
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 Note that the benchmark group is the category of widely-held banks (Widely).  
18
 Details on the source and the definition of these indexes are provided in Table 2.    
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periods.    
3.1. Ultimate ownership characteristics in Western Europe  
 Over the pre-crisis period (2002-2006), our dataset indicates19 that around 87% of the 
observations relate to banks controlled by at least one ultimate shareholder. Amongst banks 
that are controlled, 57% of the observations refer to an ultimate shareholder with equal 
control and cash-flow rights and 43% to an ultimate shareholder with excess control rights.  
To better emphasize the ownership characteristics of the sample banks, we further analyze 
the ownership type depending on (i) the presence and the absence of excess control rights and 
(ii) the level of shareholder protection rights. We hence divide the sampled banks into two 
groups based on the median value of the excess control rights variable: banks without excess 
control rights (ExcessControl=0) and banks with excess control rights (ExcessControl>0).20 
We again split each subsample of banks (with and without excess control rights) with respect 
to the median value of the shareholder protection index21 into countries with above-median 
(strong rights) and below-median (weak rights) shareholder protection rights. In panel A of 
Table 3, for each subsample of banks with and without excess control rights we report 
information on the proportion of each largest shareholder category. In panel B of Table 3, we 
report the same information with respect to the level of shareholder protection (strong versus 
weak rights).   
Considering panel A, the data show that, while in the absence of excess control rights the 
largest ultimate controlling owner is essentially (34.41% of the observations) another bank 
(Bank), banks are more rarely controlling owners with excess control rights (only 19.03% of 
the observations). Families (Family) and states (State) are predominantly controlling 
shareholders with excess control rights (respectively 34.20% and 16.89% of the observations) 
but they are less present in banks without excess control rights (respectively 19.86% and 
4.12% of the observations). Institutional investors (Institutional) and industrial companies 
(Industry) are almost equally distributed across the two subsamples; they respectively 
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 Note that the sample characteristics provided in this paragraph are not tabulated.   
20
 A bank is classified as without excess control rights if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with equal control 
and cash-flow rights or if it is widely-held. A bank is classified as with excess control rights if it is controlled by 
an ultimate owner with greater control than cash-flow rights. The classification of banks as without or with 
excess control rights changes over time. Amongst the 788 banks in our sample, 430 are continuously categorized 
as without excess control rights and 288 as with excess control rights while 70 banks switch from one category 
to the other over the pre-crisis period. 
21
 In our sample, the index, as defined by Djankov et al. (2008), has a median value of three and ranges from one 
(Luxembourg) with the weakest protection to five (Spain and the United Kingdom) with the highest level of 
shareholder protection.  
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represent 8.94% and 8.79% (12.27% and 9.07%) of the observations in the absence (presence) 
of excess control rights. Foundations are also less frequent in both subsamples but they 
exhibit an even weaker presence in banks without excess control rights (2.68% versus 8.54% 
of the observations).22 In the subsample of banks without excess control rights, widely held 
banks represent about 20% of the observations.      
Panel B of Table 3 shows that widely-held banks are much more present in countries with 
strong shareholder protection (59.64% versus 40.36%). This is consistent with the view that 
strong shareholder protection mitigates expropriation and therefore facilitates dispersed 
ownership (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; 
Shehzad et al., 2010). The level of shareholder protection does not affect the distribution of 
shareholder categories even though, in the absence of excess control rights, states (States) and 
institutional investors (Institutional) are slightly more present in countries with strong 
shareholder protection. In the presence of excess control rights, the data show that banks 
(Bank), families (Family) and states (State) prevail in countries with strong shareholder 
protection (respectively 68.85%, 63.78% and 62.46% of the observations).23  
Table 4 compares the key financial characteristics for the subsamples of banks without and 
with excess control rights before, during, and after the crisis. It mainly shows that banks with 
excess control rights are less capitalized (lower equity-to-total assets ratio) during the pre-
crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods.24 The cost-to-income ratio (CostIncomeRatio) is not 
different for banks with and without excess control rights before and after the crisis. However, 
during the crisis banks with excess control rights have a lower cost-to-income ratio suggesting 
that they become significantly more cost-efficient. The table also indicates that banks with 
excess control rights have higher ratios of non-performing loans than other banks before and 
after the crisis.  
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
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 Our dataset indicates (not reported in the Table) that, in the subsample of banks without excess control rights, 
each shareholder category holds more than 50% (majority) of the cash-flow rights, consistently with the view 
that controlling shareholders with equal rights are more oriented to profit maximization rather than expropriation 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Haw et al., 2010).          
23
 Further details (not reported in Table 3) show that, consistent with the expropriation hypothesis (Claessens et 
al., 2002; Azofra and Santamaría, 2011), families (Family) enhance their control (higher divergence between 
control and cash-flow rights) in countries with weak shareholder protection rights where extraction of private 
benefits of control is easier.   
24
 A deeper look at the descriptive statistics (not reported in Table 4) shows that lower equity-to-total assets ratio 
during the pre- and post-crisis periods is mainly attributed to family-controlled banks and to banks located in 
countries with weak shareholder protection but during the crisis lower equity-to-assets ratio is essentially 
attributable to non-family controlled banks and banks based in countries with strong protection. 
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3.2. Excess control rights, profitability and risk: univariate analysis  
Table 5 compares the performance (profitability and risk) of banks with and without excess 
control rights before, during, and after the crisis.   
Before the crisis (2002-2006), banks with excess control rights have a significantly lower 
profitability (ROA), higher earnings volatility (the standard deviation of ROA) and higher 
default risk, asset risk and leverage risk (lower ZScore, Z1Score and Z2Score respectively) 
than banks without excess control rights. Such stylized facts are consistent with the 
expropriation hypothesis of divergence between control and cash-flow rights (Claessens et al., 
2002; Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010; Azofra and Santamaría, 2011). However, during the 
crisis period (2007-2008), banks with excess control rights perform better than other banks. 
They exhibit a significantly higher profitability (0.73% against 0.68%) and lower earnings 
volatility (0.33% against 0.37%) than their peers, with no longer any significant difference in 
terms of asset, leverage and default risk. A possible explanation could be the lower incentives 
for controlling shareholders with excess control rights to undertake lax decisions as suggested 
by their higher cost-efficiency during the crisis (Table 4). Alternatively, such banks might 
have also benefited from private support from their ultimate controlling shareholders or their 
related-firms within the pyramid. After the crisis (2009-2010), banks with excess control 
rights are again less profitable (ROA) and more risky (higher SDROA and lower ZScore and 
Z2Score) than other banks suggesting that the reversed effect observed during the crisis is not 
persistent.   
[Insert Table 5 about here]    
4. Econometric results 
  We first examine the effect of excess control rights on bank profitability and risk before, 
during, and after the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and then look at various factors that 
could influence such an effect. We also investigate the changes in individual and industry-
adjusted bank profitability during and after the crisis and test for potential nonlinear 
relationships between excess control rights and bank profitability and risk.  
4.1. Effect of excess control rights on bank profitability and risk  
We estimate the coefficients of Eq. (1) using the random effects model (Generalized Least 
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Square estimation method GLS)25 with robust standard errors since (i) the Fisher test rejects 
the null hypothesis of homogeneity in the individual dimension and (ii) the Hausman test fails 
to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the regressors. Table 6 reports the estimation 
results.  
Before the crisis (2002-2006), higher excess control rights are associated with poorer 
profitability (ROA), higher risk-taking (SDROA) and higher default risk (ZScore), as well as 
higher asset risk (Z1Score) and leverage risk (Z2Score): ) is negative and significant for the 
profitability, default risk, asset risk and leverage risk proxies and positive and significant for 
the risk-taking proxy. Our results also reveal that the effect of excess control rights on 
profitability and risk is significantly different during the crisis and the pre-crisis periods: )	 is 
significant in all the regressions and carries the opposite sign to ). Particularly, the Wald test 
indicates that while the effect of excess control rights on bank profitability is completely 
reversed during the crisis period () + )	 is positive and significant), its positive effect on 
risk simply disappears () + )	 is not significant for risk variables). Furthermore, the results 
indicate that the effect of excess control rights on bank profitability and risk is not different 
across the pre- and post-crisis periods () is not significant in all the regressions). As shown 
by the Wald test, after the crisis, we again find excess control rights to be negatively linked 
with profitability and positively with risk. These results from the recovery period highlight 
that the reversed effect observed during the crisis is short-lived.  
 The effect of excess control rights on bank profitability and risk is not only statistically 
significant but also economically important. For instance, considering its effect on 
profitability, a one standard deviation (27.91%) increase in excess control rights decreases the 
profitability proxy (ROA) by 16.39% and 8.20% of its mean respectively before and after the 
crisis.26 During the crisis period, a one standard deviation increase in excess control rights 
increases the profitability proxy (ROA) by 8.20% of its mean (from 0.68% to 0.74%).  
Regarding the bank-level control variables, most of them enter significant and carry the 
expected sign as in previous studies. Not surprisingly, both crisis and post-crisis dummies 
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 Prior studies (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Himmelberg et al. 1999; Almeida et al. 2011) highlight that 
ownership is endogenous because it is affected by the firm’s level of profitability and risk. We hence test for the 
presence of endogeneity for the excess control rights variable (ExcessControl). Following Laeven and Levine 
(2009) and  Lin et al. (2011), for each bank in a given country we use an average measure of ExcessControl 
obtained from all other banks in the same country to instrument ExcessControl. The Hausman test, used to 
determine whether the variable ExcessControl is endogenous, shows that the null hypothesis of exogeneity is not 
rejected. 
26
 For example, the effect of excess control rights on profitability before the crisis is computed as follows: 
9-./
9:;<288=>?@>A Crisis = PostCrisis = 0 = −0.004 × 27.91 ≈ 0.11 
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show a drop in profitability and an increase in risk during both periods, likely because of the 
adverse effects of the crisis but also because banks needed to secure a higher portion of their 
loans after the crisis.27 The results also indicate a lower profitability (ROA) for larger banks, 
less volatile earnings (lower SDROA), a lower asset risk (higher Z1Score) but a higher 
probability of failure (lower ZScore and Z2Score). In contrast, better capitalized28 banks are 
more profitable (higher ROA), take more risk (higher SDROA) but they are less vulnerable 
(higher ZScore and Z2Score). We also find banks more reliant on deposit funding to exhibit a 
higher profitability and a lower asset risk (higher Z1Score). While banks with a higher share 
of loans in total assets are less risky, banks more reliant on non-interest generating activities 
are more profitable but also more vulnerable (lower ZScore and Z2Score); a finding 
consistent with the view that an expansion into non-traditional activities leads to higher risk 
(Lepetit et al., 2008). Less cost-efficient banks are less profitable and more risky. As 
expected, we find that publicly listed banks are more profitable but more risky than privately 
owned banks. The dummy variables included to account for the type of the controlling 
shareholder are generally non-significant.  
Considering the country-level control variables, some of them appear as significant. As 
expected, we find that the annual growth rate of the gross domestic product is positively 
associated with profitability (ROA) and negatively with risk. We also find that banks 
operating in countries with stronger shareholder protection have a higher profitability and take 
more risk. The results show that stronger capital oversight reduces risk. Finally, we find that 
banks located in countries with strong supervisory power take more risk but their probability 
of default is lower presumably because they are better capitalized.   
To summarize, we find that the presence of excess control rights does not uniformly affect 
bank profitability and risk across sound and crisis periods. Specifically, in line with the 
entrenchment view (Claessens et al., 2002; Azofra and Santamaría 2011), our results show 
that being controlled by an ultimate owner with sharper divergence between control and cash-
flow rights contributes to lower profitability before the crisis. Our findings also indicate that it 
increases risk-taking and default risk. However, our results show that, during the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008, excess control rights had the opposite effect: they contributed to improve 
bank profitability without impacting risk. A possible explanation could be that entrenched 
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 In our sample, the ratio of loan loss provisions has increased from 0.39% before the crisis to 0.54% during the 
crisis and further to 0.81% after the crisis.  
28
 Note that in the reported results, to deal with colinearity, Equity is orthogonalized with respect to bank size 
(Log(Assets)).   
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controlling shareholders were voluntarily and temporarily postponing their opportunistic 
behavior to keep the bank in business and benefit from future profits (Friedman et al., 2003). 
Alternatively, because of higher market discipline and closer supervisory scrutiny during the 
crisis, such shareholders might have had less latitude to pursue their own interests. Finally, 
our results indicate that such a reversed effect was short-lived and quickly disappeared after 
the crisis. 
4.2. Deeper investigation of the impact of excess control rights on profitability and risk    
In this subsection, we go deeper by investigating the factors that may affect the relationship 
between excess control rights and bank profitability and risk before, during, and after the 
crisis. We also look more closely into the changes in profitability during and after the crisis 
and test for the presence of non-linearity in the observed relationships.  
4.2.1. Factors influencing the effect of excess control rights on bank profitability and risk  
Consistent with the entrenchment view, our main results indicate that banks controlled by a 
shareholder with excess control rights underperform other banks before and after the crisis but 
that they outperform them during the crisis. Since entrenchment behavior might vary across 
owner type (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and the level of shareholder 
protection (La Porta et al., 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 2004), we test whether these factors 
affect the observed relationships during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. Hence, if 
the observed effect is mainly due to the entrenchment behavior of the controlling shareholder, 
we expect it to be stronger in family-controlled banks and in banks located in countries with 
weak shareholder protection since expropriation is more likely to occur in these two 
situations. In other words, the poor performance observed before and after the crisis should be 
enhanced in family-controlled banks and in countries with weak shareholder protection and 
the reversed impact of excess control rights during the crisis should be short-lived. For this 
purpose, we augment Eq. (1) as follows:   
 
Y = Jα + α	Crisis + αPostCrisis + β + β	Crisis + βPostCrisisFactorN 
										ExcessControl + δ + τFactorTDummy + φX + γZ + α% + ε, 
(2)
where Factor is a dummy variable which refers to one of the two factors that are expected to 
affect the relationship between excess control rights and bank performance: (i) Family which 
takes the value of one if the bank is family-controlled, and zero otherwise; (ii) ShareRight 
which takes the value of one if the bank is located in a country with weak shareholder 
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protection (anti-director index lower than the median value equal to three), and zero 
otherwise.29 Depending on the factor we consider (family ownership or the level of 
shareholder protection), the parameters α, α + α	 and α + α measure the effect of excess 
control rights on bank performance in non-family controlled banks or in countries with strong 
shareholder protection (Factor=0) during respectively the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis 
periods. The parameters α + β, α + α	 + β + β	 and α + α + β + β capture the 
effect of excess control rights on bank performance in family-controlled banks or in countries 
with weak shareholder protection (Factor=1) during respectively the pre-crisis, crisis, and 
post-crisis periods.  
Effect of family ownership 
Table 7 reports the results obtained from estimating Eq. (2) when we consider the owner 
type (family- versus non-family ownership) as the factor affecting the relationship between 
excess control rights and bank profitability and risk.  
Consistent with our predictions, we find that the effect of excess control is enhanced in 
family-controlled banks independently of the period we consider. Before the crisis, although 
excess control rights negatively affect profitability and positively impact risk irrespective of 
the owner type, the results indicate that such an entrenchment behavior is aggravated in 
family-controlled banks (β is negative and significant for ROA, ZScore, Z1Score and 
Z2Score). During the crisis period, while the effect of excess control rights on profitability 
and earnings volatility simply disappears in non-family controlled banks (α + α	 is not 
significant in the ROA and SDROA regressions), the Wald test shows that such an effect is 
completely reversed in family-controlled banks: excess control rights increase profitability 
and reduce both earnings volatility and asset risk (Z1Score). Furthermore, the results indicate 
that, unlike for non-family controlled banks, the effect of excess control rights on default and 
leverage risks (ZScore and Z2Score) disappears in family-controlled banks during the crisis. 
After the crisis, family-controlled banks return to their pre-crisis performance (profitability 
and risk) more quickly than non-family controlled banks as shown by the Wald tests.   
Effect of shareholder protection rights   
Table 8 presents the results obtained from estimating Eq. (2) when the level of shareholder 
protection is considered as the factor affecting the relationship between excess control rights 
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 To allow for easier interpretation we also replace the RightsProtection index by the ShareRight binary variable 
in the vector of country level variables (Z). 
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and bank profitability and risk.  
As expected, the negative impact of excess control rights on bank profitability and risk 
before the crisis is stronger in countries with weak shareholder protection (β is negative and 
significant for ROA, ZScore, Z1Score and Z2Score), suggesting that strong shareholder 
protection constrains the entrenchment behavior of shareholders with excess control rights. 
Similarly, while the impact of excess control rights on profitability and earnings volatility 
simply vanishes during the crisis in countries with strong shareholder protection (α + α	 is 
not significant in the ROA and SDROA regressions), it is completely reversed in countries 
with weak shareholder protection (α + α	 is positive and significant in the ROA and 
Z1Score regressions and negative and significant in the SDROA regression). Also, while the 
presence of excess control rights is still associated with higher default risk and leverage risk 
(ZScore and Z2Score) in countries with strong shareholder protection during the crisis period, 
such an effect disappears in countries with weak shareholder protection. This suggests that 
banks located in countries with weak shareholder protection and which were prone to 
expropriation before the crisis, were also more resilient during the crisis period compared to 
their peers. After the crisis, banks based in countries with weak shareholder protection return 
to their prior habits more quickly than those operating in a more protective environment.       
4.2.2. Changes in profitability and industry-adjusted profitability  
For deeper insights on the changes in bank profitability during and after the crisis, we 
estimate the following cross-section model:   
 
Y = α	ExcessControl + φX + γZ< + α% + ε, (3) 
where Y is either the change in profitability for bank i (DROA) or the change in its 
performance relatively to the banking industry as a whole which is also a proxy of a change in 
systematic risk exposure (DROAR). ExcessControl corresponds to the difference between 
control and cash-flow rights as of 2006. X and Z< are vectors of control variables averaged 
over the 2002-2006 period computed respectively at the bank and country levels.30  
The change in bank profitability (DROA) is defined as the difference between a bank's ROA 
during (after) the crisis and its mean value before the crisis (2002-2006). Higher values of 
DROA indicate that the bank performed better during (after) the crisis than it used to do 
before the crisis but might also indicate that the bank suffered less during (after) the crisis. 
We construct DROAR on the basis of the bank’s industry-adjusted profitability which is the 
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 Both vectors include the same set of control variables as in Eq. (1).  
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difference between a bank's ROA and the average ROA of all the banks in our sample, both 
measured at the same period. The bank’s industry-adjusted profitability reflects the bank’s 
relative performance with regards to the industry for a given period. We then compute the 
ratio of the bank’s industry-adjusted profitability during (after) the crisis to its industry-
adjusted profitability before the crisis. This measure captures the extent to which a given bank 
out- or under-performed its peers during (after) the crisis compared to its relative performance 
before the crisis. Higher values of the ratio indicate that the bank is more profitable compared 
to its peers during (after) the crisis than it used to be before the crisis but could also mean that 
it suffered relatively less during (after) the crisis.31 We use as indicators of individual bank 
profitability and industry-level profitability before the crisis the mean values of ROA at the 
individual- and industry-level over the 2002-2006 period.  
Table 9 reports the results of estimating Eq. (3) using Ordinary Least Square method 
(OLS).32 We find excess control rights to be positively associated with DROA and DROAR 
indicating that, during the crisis, excess control rights contribute to better performance at the 
individual bank level but also to a better performance of banks relatively to their peers. 
Hence, the presence of excess control rights has apparently contributed to lower systematic 
risk exposure. However, the results indicate that excess control rights are no longer 
significantly linked with DROA and DROAR during the post-crisis period, indicating that the 
difference between post-crisis and pre-crisis bank profitability (DROA) and the change in 
relative performance with regards to peers (DROAR) are not affected by excess control rights. 
These results together confirm the findings from the preceding panel regression analyses. 
4.2.3. Testing for non-linearity in the relationship between excess control rights and bank 
performance  
We now test whether the relationship between excess control rights and bank profitability 
and risk depends on the extent of the shareholder’s excess control rights. Previous studies 
(Morck et al., 1988; Adams and Santos, 2006) show that the relationship between ownership 
and performance (profitability and risk) is not linear. Similarly, in our study we assume that 
the observed entrenchment behavior is triggered only when excess control rights reach a 
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 To allow for easier interpretation, we define DROAR as: DROARS = %%TU-./
VVVVVVVW	T-./XYZ[\]^_VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV`	
%%TU-./WaT	-./aWYZ[\]^_`
, where i refers 
to the bank and p to the period we consider (crisis or post-crisis period).  ROAVVVVVV	 stands for pre-crisis individual 
bank profitability and ROAindustryVVVVVVVVVVV for pre-crisis industry-level profitability.      
32
 To compute changes in bank profitability, we restrict our sample to banks with at least one observation for 
ROA in each period (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis period). This criterion reduces our sample of banks to 480. 
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sufficient level and that the marginal effect declines at higher levels. At very low levels, the 
controlling shareholder may not be entrenched and at very high levels, the relationship may 
even become flat. To address this potential non-linearity in the relationship between excess 
control rights and bank profitability and risk, we replace our variable of interest 
(ExcessControl) by a set of four dummy variables based on the four quartiles of the excess 
control rights variable (Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4): ExcessControlQ1 equal to one if 
0<ExcessControl<=Q1, and zero otherwise; ExcessControlQ2 equal to one if 
Q1<ExcessControl<=Q2, and zero otherwise; ExcessControlQ3 equal to one if 
Q2<ExcessControl<=Q3, and zero otherwise; and finally ExcessControlQ4 equal to one if 
ExcessControl>Q3, and zero otherwise. We hence use the following model where the 
removed category is the group of banks without excess control rights (ExcessControl=0) 
which includes banks controlled by a shareholder with equal control and cash-flow rights as 
well as widely-held banks:     
 
Y = cαdExcessControlQd
f
dg
+ CrisiscβdExcessControlQd
f
dg
+ PostCrisis 
								∑ τdExcessControlQdfdg + δTDummy + φX + γZ + α% + ε  
 
(4) 
Table 10 reports the results of estimating Eq. (4). For values lower than the second quartile, 
the coefficients of ExcessControlQ1 and ExcessControlQ2 are statistically non-significant 
when the dependent variable is profitability (ROA) or asset risk (Z1Score). Banks controlled 
by a shareholder with excess control rights greater than the second quartile (Q2) exhibit a 
significantly lower profitability than banks without excess control rights. For instance, before 
the crisis the return on average assets is 0.20% lower for a bank with excess control rights in 
the range Q2-Q3 than for a bank without excess control rights.33 Before the crisis, when the 
dependent variable is earnings volatility (SDROA), default risk (ZScore) or leverage risk 
(Z2Score), the results show that excess control rights positively affect risk even at lower 
levels of excess control rights (Q1-Q2). Similarly, the improvement in bank profitability and 
risk (ROA, SDROA, ZScore and Z2Score) during the crisis is only effective for values of 
excess control rights greater than the second quartile (Q2). The results also show that, after the 
crisis, banks controlled by a shareholder with excess control rights greater than the second 
quartile return to their pre-crisis habits.   
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 Note that when the excess control rights variable reaches the second quartile, its effect (in terms of coefficient 
magnitude) is almost similar independently of its range. This indicates that when excess control rights are 
relatively high, the relationship between excess control rights and bank profitability and risk is flat (the marginal 
effect of increasing excess control rights is almost null).    
23 
 
5. Robustness checks  
In this section, we run various regressions to check the robustness of the results obtained in 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2. To save space we only report the robustness for the main results 
obtained in Section 4.1 (see Appendix).34  
First, to control for country specificities, we remove time-invariant country-level variables 
(RightsProtection, CapitalStringency and OfficialSupervisory) and replace them by country 
dummies. Considering these alternative control variables leads to almost similar conclusions 
(see Table A2 in the Appendix).  
Second, we compute our dependent variables on the basis of 2-year rolling-window instead 
of 3-year rolling-window. The obtained results are consistent with our main findings (see 
Table A3 in the Appendix).  
Third, we remove banks that benefitted from government support during the crisis 
(corresponding to 221 observations). Such banks might display spurious accounting 
information leading to biased profitability and earnings' volatility measures. Our results 
remain unchanged (see Table A4 in the Appendix).   
Fourth, we increase the control threshold and recalculate ownership variables with a control 
level of 20% instead of 10%. This new minimum control threshold changes our dataset both 
quantitatively and qualitatively35 but our main results are unchanged (see Table A5 in the 
Appendix).36   
Finally, to check the robustness of our results, we run the regressions on sub-samples of pre-
crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods instead of using interaction terms. Our main conclusions 
remain the same (see Table A6 in the Appendix).  
6. Conclusion  
The objective of this study is to empirically investigate whether the presence of ultimate 
shareholders with excess control rights affects bank profitability and risk and how the 2007-
2008 financial crisis might have modified such relationships. For this purpose, we construct a 
dataset on ultimate control and ownership structure of 788 commercial banks based in 17 
Western European countries during the 2002-2010 period which covers the pre-crisis, crisis, 
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 The robustness checks on Section 4.2 lead to almost similar conclusions and are available on request. 
35
 With a threshold of 20% instead of 10%, our dataset contains a higher proportion of banks considered as 
widely held and banks controlled by another bank. The proportion of family and state-owned banks is lower.  
36
 Note that we also check the robustness of our results by performing further estimations using this new control 
threshold (20%). We run all the checks performed with the dataset based on a 10% threshold. In all cases, our 
main results -not reported here and available on request- remain unchanged.   
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and post-crisis periods.  
Our findings show that, before the crisis, a larger divergence between ultimate shareholders' 
control and cash-flow rights is associated with lower profitability and higher risk-taking and 
default risk. However, our results also highlight the existence of a reversed effect: divergence 
between both types of rights positively impacts profitability and no longer affects risk during 
the crisis. A closer look into the changes in profitability indicates that excess control rights 
have contributed to enhance banks' performance -compared to the pre-crisis period- both 
individually and relatively to their peers. Our results from the recovery period (2009-2010) 
show that such a reversal was short-lived. Just like before the crisis, the presence of excess 
control rights negatively affects bank profitability and positively impacts default risk after the 
crisis. Further investigation shows that the relationship between excess control rights and 
bank profitability and risk is enhanced (i) in family-controlled banks, (ii) in countries with 
relatively weak shareholder protection and (iii) is only effective at intermediate and high 
levels of excess control rights.   
As a whole, we show that ownership structure does matter in explaining cross-variation in 
bank performance during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Our findings have various policy 
implications. First, although banks controlled via complex pyramidal arrangements might be 
less profitable and more risky than their peers in normal times, they also appear to be more 
resilient to shocks possibly because of their strong links with related firms in the pyramid. 
Second, bank monitoring and supervision by regulators should closely account for 
shareholder behavior in complex ownership structures. Furthermore, market discipline should 
also be enhanced by increasing the level of shareholder protection and by a better disclosure 
of banks' controlling shareholders and of their stakes in other banks and firms.           
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Table 1. Distribution of European commercial banks and representativeness of the final 
sample  
Country All Banks Listed Banks Percent of total assets  
Austria 43 4 42.746 
Belgium 23 1 94.104 
Denmark 47 36 94.557 
Finland 4 1 82.766 
France 105 12 83.358 
Germany 85 13 74.834 
Greece 14 9 93.013 
Ireland 16 4 64.299 
Italy 109 17 87.852 
Luxembourg 62 4 81.714 
Netherlands 27 5 70.273 
Norway 7 3 72.792 
Portugal 16 3 86.346 
Spain 41 9 80.601 
Sweden 13 2 83.119 
Switzerland 86 4 86.665 
United Kingdom 90 5 73.284 
Total/Average 788 132 79.54 
Percent of total assets=percentage of total assets of the sample banks in a given country to the aggregate total 
assets of all commercial banks provided by BankScope in the same country over the 2002-2010 period. 
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Table 2: Definition and descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in the regressions 
 
Variable Description, source* and time period Mean Median Std.Dev  Max  Min  Obs 
Dependent variable (%). Source: Bankscope and authors’ calculations. Period: 2002-2010 
ROA 3-year rolling-window mean of the return on average assets defined as the ratio of net income to 
average total assets*    
0.681 0.533 0.680 3.742 -1.186 4,451 
SDROA 3-year rolling-window standard deviation of the return on average assets  0.350 0.196 0.456 6.392 0.012 4,451 
ZScore Measure of bank default risk. ZScore=(ROA+ (equity/assets))/SDROA where equity/assets is the 3-year 
rolling-window mean of the ratio of total equity to total assets  
66.654 46.374 65.843 470.673 1.964 4,451 
Z1Score  Measure of bank asset risk. Z1Score=ROA/SDROA   4.778 3.343 5.038 27.246 -2.753 4,451 
Z2Score Measure of leverage risk. Z2Score=(equity/assets)/SDROA  61.876 42.706 62.335 448.155 2.846 4,451 
Bank specific independent variables 
Ownership variables: Source: Bankscope, Amadeus, Annual reports and authors’ calculations. Period: 2002-2006 
ExcessControl (%) Difference between control and cash-flow rights  15.968 0 27.910 99.995 0 4,451 
Bank Dummy equal to one if the largest controlling owner is a bank; and zero otherwise 0.286 0 0.452 1 0 4,451 
Family Dummy equal to one if the largest controlling owner is an individual, a family or a manager; and zero 
otherwise 
0.229 0 0.420 1 0 4,451 
State Dummy equal to one if the largest controlling owner is a state or a public authority; and zero otherwise 0.090 0 0.286 1 0 4,451 
Institutional Dummy equal to one if the largest controlling owner is a financial company, an insurance company, a 
mutual or a pension fund; and zero otherwise 
0.102 0 0.303 1 0 4,451 
Industry Dummy equal to one if the largest controlling owner is an industrial firm; and zero otherwise 0.089 0 0.285 1 0 4,451 
Foundation Dummy equal to one if the largest controlling owner is a foundation or research institute; and zero 
otherwise 
0.055 0 0.228 1 0 4,451 
Other bank specific independent variables: Period: 2002-2010 
Log(Assets) (Millions of Euros) Natural logarithm of total assets  7.760 7.410 2.227 14.546 2.681 4,451 
Equity (%) Ratio of total equity to total assets  9.627 7.491 7.270 48.418 1.761 4,451 
Deposits (%) Ratio of total customer deposits to total assets  51.366 53.370 24.394 91.243 1.200 4,451 
Loans (%) Ratio of net loans to total assets  50.880 55.668 26.224 94.479 2.032 4,451 
NNII (%) Ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income   37.769 33.346 26.581 108.696 -29.018 4,451 
CostIncomeRatio (%) Cost to income ratio  64.348 63.712 21.443 351.111 1.266 4,451 
Listed Dummy equal to one if the bank is publicly listed; and zero otherwise 0.200 0 0.400 1 0 4,451 
Rescue  Dummy equal to one if the bank was rescued during the 2007-2008 financial crisis; and zero otherwise. 
Source: Petrovic and Tutsch (2009) and authors’ calculations.   
0.021 0  0.145 1  0  4,451 
Crisis Dummy equal to one if the year is 2007 or 2008; and zero otherwise  0.236 0 0.425 1 0 4,451  
PostCrisis Dummy equal to one if the year is 2009 or 2010; and zero otherwise 0.226 0 0.418 1 0 4,451 
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Country specific independent variables 
GDPGrowth (%)  Real GDP (Growth Domestic Product) growth rate. Source: World Bank Database.  Period: 2002-2010   1.227 1.881 2.533 6.639 -8.204 4,451 
RightsProtection Anti-director index of the level of shareholder protection. This index is obtained by adding one when: 
(1) shareholders are allowed to mail in their proxy votes to the firm; (2) shareholders are not required to 
deposits hares before any general shareholders’ meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional 
representation of minorities in the board is allowed; (4) minority shareholders have legal mechanisms 
against perceived oppression by the board; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for a special shareholders’ meeting is no more than 10%; or (6) shareholders have 
preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. Source: Djankov et al. (2008)  
3.064 3 1.091 5 1 4,451 
CapitalStringency Regulatory capital stringency index. This index is the total number of affirmative answers to the 
following questions: (1) Is the minimum capital ratio requirement in line with the Basel guidelines? (2) 
Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? (3) Does the minimum ratio vary as a 
function of credit risk? (4) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of operational risk? (5) Is there a 
simple leverage ratio required? (6) Are market values of loan losses not realized in accounting books 
deducted from capital? (7) Are unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted? (8) Are unrealized 
foreign exchange losses deducted? (9) Are accounting practices for banks in accordance with 
International Accounting Standards? Source: (Barth et al., 2001) and authors’ calculations 
6.831 7 1.504 9 3 4,451 
OfficialSupervisory Index of official supervisory power. This index is the total number of affirmative answers to the 
following questions: (1) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to 
discuss their report without the approval of the bank? (2) Are auditors required by law to communicate 
directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in 
illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? (3) Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors 
for negligence? (4) Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational 
structure? (5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency 
order the bank's directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? (7) 
Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute: (a) Dividends? (b) Bonuses? 
(c) Management fees? (8) Can the supervisory agency legally declare-such that this declaration 
supersedes the rights of bank shareholders-that a bank is insolvent? (9) Does the Banking Law give 
authority to the supervisory agency to intervene that is, suspend some or all ownership rights-a problem 
bank? (10) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other 
government agency do the following: (a) Supersede shareholder rights? (b) Remove and replace 
management? (c) Remove and replace directors? Source: (Barth et al., 2001) and authors’ calculations 
9.944 10 2.132 14 5 4,451 
* All variables are retrieved from Bankscope database unless otherwise indicated.  
**
 average assets=(total assets at time t + total assets at time t-1)/2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: continued 
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Table 3: Ownership characteristics by excess control rights and by the level of shareholder protection, on average, over the period 2002-2006  
 ExcessControl=0 
(2,764 obs) 
ExcessControl>0 
(1,687 obs) 
ExcessControl=0 
(2,764 obs) 
ExcessControl>0 
(1,687 obs) 
 
PANEL A: All countries 
PANEL B: level of shareholder protection 
 Strong rights (1,445 obs)   Weak rights (1,319 obs) Strong rights (1,006 obs)  Weak rights (681 obs) 
 
%  (Number) of 
observations   
Number of 
banks 
%  (Number) 
of obs   
Number of 
banks 
%  (Number) 
of obs   
Number of 
banks 
%  (Number) 
of obs   
Number of 
banks 
%  (Number) 
of obs   
Number of 
banks 
%  (Number) 
of obs   
Number of 
banks 
Bank 34.407 
(951) 
195 19.028  
(321) 
73 47.214 
(449) 
101 52.786 
(502) 
94 68.847 
(221) 
47 31.153 
(100) 
26 
Family 19.863     
(549)   
117 34.203  
(577) 
139 42.987     
(236)   
52 57.013     
(313)   
65 63.778     
(368)   
81 36.222     
(209)   
58 
State 4.124         
(114) 
22 16.894 
(285) 
64 68.421         
(78) 
14 31.579         
(36) 
8 62.456         
(178) 
40 37.544         
(107) 
24 
Institutional 8.936     
(247) 
57 12.270 
(207) 
47 65.182     
(161) 
40 34.818     
(86) 
17 42.512     
(88) 
24 57.488     
(119) 
23 
Industry 8.792     
(243) 
62 9.069 
(153) 
38 55.967     
(136) 
35 44.033     
(107) 
27 54.902     
(84) 
23 45.098     
(69) 
15 
Foundation 2.677         
(100) 
18 8.536  
(144) 
30 33.784         
(51) 
9 66.216         
(49) 
9 46.528         
(67) 
13 53.472         
(77) 
17 
Widely 20.260 
(560) 
126 -  59.643 
(334) 
 40.357 
(226) 
     
Subsamples definition: A bank is classified as without excess control rights (ExcessControl=0) if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with equal control and cash-flow rights or if it is widely 
held. A bank is classified as with excess control rights (ExcessControl>0) if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with greater control rights than cash-flow rights. Strong rights (Weak rights) 
refer to banks located in countries with above-median (below-median) value of the shareholder protection index.    
Variables definition: Bank=the largest ultimate controlling owner is a bank; Family=the largest ultimate controlling owner is an individual, a family or a manager; State=the largest ultimate 
controlling owner is a state or a public authority; Institutional=the largest ultimate controlling owner is a financial company, an insurance company, a mutual or a pension fund; Industry=the 
largest ultimate controlling owner is an industrial firm; Foundation=the largest ultimate controlling owner is a foundation or a research institute; Widely=the bank itself is widely held. 
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Table 4: Key financial characteristics of banks without and with excess control rights, on average, across the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis 
periods   
 Pre-crisis period (2002-2006) Crisis period (2007-2008) Post-crisis period (2009-2010) 
 
ExcessControl=0  
(0)  
ExcessControl>0  
(1) 
T-stat 
(0)-(1) 
ExcessControl=0   
(0) 
ExcessControl>0  
(1) 
T-stat 
(0)-(1) 
ExcessControl=0   
(0) 
ExcessControl>0  
(1) 
T-stat  
(0)-(1)  
Assets 38393.292 36383.871 0.231  44698.885 34286.501 0.979 50852.099 47046.177 0.303 
Equity  10.577 8.763 2.429**  9.932 8.334 3.537*** 9.658 8.732 2.186**  
Deposits 52.693 47.534 5.025***  53.612 47.354 4.040***   54.942 49.797 3.320***   
Loans  51.848 48.335 1.249   52.150 51.625 0.311  51.650 48.945 1.566  
NNII 38.222 38.104 0.106  35.801 35.665 0.079  38.414 39.684 -0.731  
CostIncomeRatio 64.491 64.461 0.034  65.697 61.146 3.042***   64.569 64.172 0.098     
NPL 2.901 3.592 -2.426**  3.330 3.410 -0.255  3.157 3.643 -1.974*  
Subsamples definition: A bank is classified as without excess control rights (ExcessControl=0) if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with equal control and cash-flow rights or if it is widely 
held. A bank is classified as with excess control rights (ExcessControl>0) if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with greater control rights than cash-flow rights.  
T-stat tests for the null: “bank financial characteristics are not different between banks without and with excess control rights during the pre-crisis, the crisis and post-crisis periods”; ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for a bilateral test. 
Variables definition: All variables are expressed in percentages except Assets which is in millions of Euros. Assets=bank’s total assets; Equity=ratio of total equity to total assets; Deposits=ratio 
of customer deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total assets; NNII=ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income; CostIncomeRatio=cost to income ratio; NPL=ratio of 
non-performing loans to gross loans.   
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Table 5: Profitability and risk by excess control rights across the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods  
 Pre-crisis period (2002-2006) Crisis period (2007-2008) Post-crisis period (2009-2010) 
 
ExcessControl=0  ExcessControl>0   T-statistics  ExcessControl=0   ExcessControl>0   T-statistics  ExcessControl=0  ExcessControl>0  T-statistics  
ROA 0.831 0.645 6.403*** 0.684 0.734 -2.056**  0.479 0.410 1.923*  
SDROA 0.338 0.385 -2.631***  0.365 0.327 2.235** 0.369 0.400 -2.094**  
ZScore 71.989 56.807 5.473***  65.642 63.463 0.774    67.064 51.827 4.455***   
Z1Score 5.070 3.830 2.242**  4.519 4.388 0.076  4.010 4.017 -0.022  
Z2Score 66.919 52.977 5.638***   61.123 59.075 0.931   63.054 47.810 4.711***   
Subsamples definition: A bank is classified as without excess control rights (ExcessControl=0) if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with equal control and cash-flow rights or if it is widely 
held. A bank is classified as with excess control rights (ExcessControl>0) if it is controlled by an ultimate owner with greater control rights than cash-flow rights.  
T-stat tests for the null: “bank profitability and risk are not different between banks with and without excess control rights during the pre-crisis, the crisis and post-crisis periods”; ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, for a bilateral test. 
Variables definition: All variables are expressed in percentages. ROA=3-year rolling-window mean of the return on average assets; SDROA=3-year rolling-window standard deviation of the 
return on average assets; ZScore=measure of bank default risk; Z1Score=measure of bank asset risk; Z2Score=measure of leverage risk. 
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Table 6: Excess control rights, bank profitability and risk (2002-2010, GLS)  
Y = α + α	Crisis + αPostCrisisExcessControl + δTDummy+ φX + γZ + α% + ε 
Dependent variable (Y)  ROA SDROA ZScore Z1Score Z2Score 
ExcessControl (α -0.004*** 0.001*** -0.270*** -0.010**  -0.260*** 
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) 
Crisis× ExcessControl (α	) 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.131** 0.008**  0.123** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.046) (0.045) 
PostCrisis× ExcessControl (α) 0.002  0.000 0.049 0.004 0.046 
(0.107) (0.836) (0.321) (0.386) (0.319) 
Crisis (δ) -0.177*** 0.028* -4.528**  -0.520** -4.008**  (0.000) (0.059) (0.046) (0.042) (0.049) 
PostCrisis (δ	) -0.295*** 0.043*** -7.145**  -1.032*** -6.113** 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.040) (0.000) (0.045) 
Log(Assets) (φ) -0.102*** -0.057*** -1.818** 0.166*** -1.974*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.004) (0.009) 
Equity (φ	) 0.218*** 0.064*** 5.011*** 0.007 4.962*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.941) (0.002) 
Deposits (φ) 0.002*** 0.000 0.096 0.018*** 0.081 
(0.000) (0.936) (0.116) (0.000) (0.157) 
Loans (φf) 0.001 -0.002*** 0.304*** 0.023*** 0.278*** 
(0.120) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NNII (φj) 0.003*** 0.000 -0.101** 0.004 -0.101*** 
(0.000) (0.226) (0.011) (0.238) (0.007) 
CostIncomeRatio (φk) -0.013*** 0.001*** -0.243*** -0.046*** -0.200*** 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Listed (φl) 0.178*** 0.050* -18.752*** -0.246 -18.473*** 
(0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.501) (0.000) 
Rescue (φm)  0.024 -0.009 -3.234 -0.364 -2.832 
(0.649) (0.833) (0.533) (0.540) (0.543) 
Bank (φn) 0.032 0.009 -4.390 0.058 -4.372 
(0.435) (0.757) (0.436) (0.880) (0.413) 
Family (φ%) 0.034 0.021 -1.717 0.290 -1.856 
(0.435) (0.475) (0.770) (0.492) (0.737) 
State (φ) 0.038 0.012 -2.831 -0.627 -2.081 
(0.550) (0.776) (0.694) (0.207) (0.762) 
Institutional (φ	) 0.004 0.011 -4.192 -0.233 -3.842 
(0.934) (0.756) (0.465) (0.603) (0.475) 
Industry (φ) 0.016 0.069 -3.162 0.254 -3.371 
(0.786) (0.144) (0.651) (0.607) (0.609) 
Foundation (φf) 0.035 -0.062 12.246 0.386 11.920 
(0.593) (0.121) (0.207) (0.541) (0.192) 
GDPGrowth (γ) 0.013*** -0.005*** 0.944*** 0.075*** 0.875*** (0.000) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
RightsProtection (γ	) 0.036** 0.033*** -1.564 -0.230 -1.305 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.278) (0.138) (0.343) 
CapitalStringency (γ) -0.016 -0.017** 2.812*** 0.222*** 2.576*** 
(0.112) (0.030) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
OfficialSupervisory (γf) 0.006 0.018*** 2.487** 0.030 2.449** 
(0.477) (0.005) (0.029) (0.616) (0.025) 
Intercept (α%) 2.048*** 0.592*** 46.819*** 3.114** 43.546** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Number of observations 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 
Number of banks 788 788 788 788 788 
R-square (overall) 0.395 0.204 0.074 0.119 0.077 
Wald tests : α + α	 0.002** -0.001 -0.139 -0.002 -0.137 
                    P-value  (0.033) (0.100) (0.101) (0.692) (0.106) 
                    α + α -0.002***  0.001** -0.221***  -0.006 -0.214*** 
                    P-value (0.001) (0.044) (0.000) (0.300) (0.000) 
Variables definition: ROA=3-year rolling-window mean of the return on average assets; SDROA=3-year rolling-window standard 
deviation of the return on average assets; ZScore=measure of bank default risk; Z1Score=measure of bank asset risk; Z2Score=measure of 
leverage risk; ExcessControl=difference between control and cash-flow rights; Crisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2007 or 2008, and 
zero otherwise; PostCrisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2009 or 2010, and zero otherwise; Log(Assets)=natural logarithm of total 
assets; Equity=ratio of total equity to total assets; Deposits=ratio of customer deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total 
assets; NNII=ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income; CostIncomeRatio=cost to income ratio; Listed=dummy equal to one 
if the bank is publicly listed, and zero otherwise; Rescue=dummy equal to one if the bank was rescued during the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, and zero otherwise; Bank-Foundation is a set of dummy variables representing the type of the largest ultimate owner (Widely is the 
benchmark group); GDPGrowth=real GDP growth rate; RightsProtection=anti-director index of the level of shareholder protection; 
CapitalStringency=regulatory capital stringency index; OfficialSupervisory=index of official supervisory power. P-values based on robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 7: Excess control rights, bank profitability and risk (2002-2010, GLS): effect of family-ownership  
Y = Jα + α	Crisis + αPostCrisis + β + β	Crisis + βPostCrisisFamilyNExcessControl + δ + 
							τFamilyTDummy+ φX + γZ + α% + ε 
Dependent variable (Y)  ROA SDROA ZScore Z1Score Z2Score 
ExcessControl (α  -0.003*** 0.001* -0.233*** -0.007*  -0.226*** 
(0.000) (0.084) (0.000) (0.059) (0.000) 
Family× ExcessControl (β) -0.003** 0.001 -0.140*  -0.010*  -0.130*  (0.033) (0.170) (0.087) (0.085)  (0.091) 
Crisis× ExcessControl (α	) 0.004* -0.001 0.052 0.009 0.043 (0.072) (0.188) (0.200) (0.278) (0.200) 
Crisis× Family× ExcessControl (β	) 0.005***  -0.002***  0.185** 0.015* 0.170*  (0.000) (0.001) (0.048) (0.064) (0.051) 
PostCrisis× ExcessControl (α) 0.002*  0.000 0.032 0.003 0.029 (0.085) (0.353) (0.577) (0.523) (0.585) 
PostCrisis× Family× ExcessControl (β) 0.001 0.002 0.089 0.006 0.083 (0.127) (0.355) (0.488) (0.381) (0.469) 
Crisis (δ) -0.189*** 0.015 -4.497 -0.523* -4.021 
(0.000) (0.349) (0.196) (0.069) (0.215) 
PostCrisis (δ	) -0.292*** 0.022 0.358 -0.912*** 1.281 (0.000) (0.172) (0.905) (0.000) (0.647) 
Family× Crisis (τ) 0.056 0.055* -4.540 -0.034 -4.533 (0.274) (0.088) (0.486) (0.939) (0.464) 
Family× PostCrisis (τ	) -0.012 0.091*** -10.837** -0.518 -10.336** (0.847) (0.006) (0.048) (0.230) (0.043) 
Log(Assets) (φ) -0.102*** -0.057*** -1.779** 0.167*** -1.935*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.004) (0.010) 
Equity (φ	) 0.218*** 0.064*** 4.987*** 0.002 4.941*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.984) (0.002) 
Deposits (φ) 0.002*** 0.000 0.096 0.018*** 0.082 (0.000) (0.898) (0.117) (0.000) (0.155) 
Loans (φf) 0.001 -0.002*** 0.305*** 0.023*** 0.280*** (0.133) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NNII (φj) 0.003*** 0.000 -0.100** 0.004 -0.099*** (0.000) (0.235) (0.012) (0.243) (0.008) 
CostIncomeRatio (φk) -0.013*** 0.001*** -0.241*** -0.046*** -0.198*** (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Listed (φl) 0.178*** 0.054* -19.025*** -0.261 -18.734*** (0.000) (0.069) (0.000) (0.471) (0.000) 
Rescue (φm) 0.035 -0.007 -3.597 -0.390 -3.170 (0.508) (0.866) (0.493) (0.510) (0.502) 
GDPGrowth (γ) 0.013*** -0.005** 0.946*** 0.075*** 0.877*** 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
RightsProtection (γ	) 0.037** 0.032*** -1.509 -0.221** -1.258 (0.012) (0.006) (0.300) (0.046) (0.365) 
CapitalStringency (γ) -0.017 -0.016** 2.771*** 0.217** 2.539** (0.101) (0.040) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) 
OfficialSupervisory (γf) 0.006 0.017*** 2.521** 0.034 2.481** (0.473) (0.008) (0.027) (0.567) (0.024) 
Intercept (α%) 2.063*** 0.604*** 45.472** 3.082** 42.232** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Ownership type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 
Number of banks 788 788 788 788 788 
R-square (overall) 0.396 0.207 0.076 0.121 0.078 
Wald tests : α + β -0.006***  0.002***  -0.373*** -0.017** -0.356***  
                    P-value (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.048) (0.001) 
                    α + α	 0.001 -0.000 -0.181**  0.002 -0.183**  
                    P-value (0.149) (0.860) (0.037) (0.505) (0.033) 
                    α + α	 + β + β	 0.003** -0.001*  -0.136 0.007** -0.143 
                    P-value  (0.025) (0.072) (0.205) (0.046) (0.193) 
                    α + α -0.001*  0.001  -0.201*** -0.004 -0.197*** 
                    P-value (0.096) (0.139) (0.001) (0.696) (0.000) 
                    α + α + β + β -0.003** 0.002** -0.252*** -0.008*  -0.244*** 
                    P-value (0.019) (0.025) (0.000) (0.088) (0.000) 
Variables definition: ROA=3-year rolling-window mean of the return on average assets; SDROA=3-year rolling-window standard 
deviation of the return on average assets; ZScore=measure of bank default risk; Z1Score=measure of bank asset risk; Z2Score=measure of 
leverage risk; ExcessControl=difference between control and cash-flow rights; Family=dummy equal to one if the largest controlling 
owner is an individual, a family or a manager, and zero otherwise; Crisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2007 or 2008, and zero 
otherwise; PostCrisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2009 or 2010, and zero otherwise; Log(Assets)=natural logarithm of total assets; 
Equity=ratio of total equity to total assets; Deposits=ratio of customer deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total assets; 
NNII=ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income; CostIncomeRatio=cost to income ratio; Listed=dummy equal to one if the 
bank is publicly listed, and zero otherwise; Rescue=dummy equal to one if the bank was rescued during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and 
zero otherwise; GDPGrowth=real GDP growth rate; RightsProtection=anti-director index of the level of shareholder protection; 
CapitalStringency=regulatory capital stringency index; OfficialSupervisory=index of official supervisory power; Ownership type=set of 
dummies representing the type of the largest ultimate owner (Widely is the benchmark group). P-values based on robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
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Table 8: Excess control rights, bank profitability and risk (2002-2010, GLS): effect of shareholder 
protection rights   
Y = Jα + α	Crisis + αPostCrisis + β + β	Crisis + βPostCrisisShareRightNExcessControl + δ + 
										τShareRightTDummy + φX + γZ + α% + ε 
Dependent variable (Y) ROA SDROA ZScore Z1Score Z2Score 
ExcessControl (α -0.002** 0.001*  -0.237*** -0.008* -0.229*** 
(0.041) (0.082) (0.000) (0.066) (0.000) 
ShareRight× ExcessControl (β) -0.003** 0.000 -0.148*  -0.009* -0.139* (0.043) (0.434) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) 
Crisis× ExcessControl (α	) 0.003* -0.001** 0.130** 0.002* 0.128** (0.064) (0.013) (0.015) (0.054) (0.015) 
Crisis× ShareRight× ExcessControl (β	) 0.004*** -0.001**  0.168** 0.025** 0.143** (0.005) (0.016) (0.010) (0.029) (0.011) 
PostCrisis× ExcessControl (α) 0.001 0.000 0.025 0.002 0.023 (0.680) (0.515) (0.217) (0.725) (0.190) 
PostCrisis× ShareRight× ExcessControl (β) 0.001 0.001 0.056 0.005 0.051 (0.174) (0.544) (0.580) (0.572) (0.510) 
Crisis (δ) -0.210*** 0.016 -6.137*  -0.879** -5.322* 
(0.000) (0.401) (0.082) (0.019) (0.094) 
PostCrisis (δ	) -0.422*** 0.041** -4.831*  -1.178*** -3.656 (0.000) (0.022) (0.066) (0.000) (0.344) 
Crisis× ShareRight (τ) 0.068* 0.022 -5.761 -0.772* -5.037 (0.091) (0.385) (0.264) (0.056) (0.298) 
PostCrisis× ShareRight (τ	) 0.263*** 0.001 -4.262 0.394 -4.656 (0.000) (0.973) (0.328) (0.255) (0.338) 
Log(Assets) (φ) -0.099*** -0.056*** -1.754** 0.175*** -1.918** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.003) (0.011) 
Equity (φ	) 0.209*** 0.065*** 5.062*** -0.026 5.037*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.773) (0.002) 
Deposits (φ) 0.002*** 0.000 0.110* 0.019*** 0.095* (0.000) (0.961) (0.071) (0.000) (0.099) 
Loans (φf) 0.001 -0.002*** 0.298*** 0.022*** 0.274*** (0.369) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NNII (φj) 0.003*** 0.000 -0.096** 0.004 -0.096*** (0.000) (0.282) (0.015) (0.193) (0.009) 
CostIncomeRatio (φk) -0.013*** 0.001*** -0.242*** -0.045*** -0.199*** (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Listed (φl) 0.171*** 0.052* -19.878*** -0.397 -19.439*** (0.000) (0.091) (0.000) (0.279) (0.000) 
Rescue (φm) -0.008 -0.007 -2.631 -0.305 -2.278 (0.877) (0.874) (0.609) (0.608) (0.621) 
GDPGrowth (γ) 0.012*** -0.005*** 1.040*** 0.085*** 0.962*** 
(0.000) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
ShareRight (γ	) -0.231*** -0.073** -2.371 -0.303 -2.069 (0.000) (0.015) (0.632) (0.352) (0.661) 
CapitalStringency (γ) -0.026** -0.017** 2.503** 0.145* 2.348** (0.013) (0.043) (0.016) (0.083) (0.017) 
OfficialSupervisory (γf) 0.004 0.016** 2.517** 0.047 2.462** (0.599) (0.015) (0.025) (0.431) (0.023) 
Intercept (α%) 2.347*** 0.742*** 43.709** 2.829** 40.811** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.019) (0.012) 
Ownership type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 
Number of banks 788 788 788 788 788 
R-square (overall) 0.413 0.204 0.075 0.122 0.077 
Wald tests : α + β -0.005***  0.001**  -0.385***  -0.017***  -0.366***  
                    P-value (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
                    α + α	 0.001 -0.000 -0.197**  -0.006 -0.189**  
                    P-value (0.479) (0.340) (0.048) (0.278) (0.049) 
                    α + α	 + β + β	 0.002**  -0.001**  -0.086 0.010**  -0.095 
                    P-value  (0.028) (0.048) (0.391) (0.032) (0.307) 
                    α + α -0.001 0.001 -0.212***  -0.006 -0.206***  
                    P-value (0.170) (0.153) (0.000) (0.367) (0.000) 
                    α + β + α + α -0.003**  0.002*  -0.306***  -0.010**  -0.294***  
                    P-value (0.017) (0.082) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) 
Variables definition: ROA=3-year rolling-window mean of the return on assets; SDROA=3-year rolling-window standard deviation of the 
return on average assets; ZScore=measure of bank default risk; Z1Score=measure of bank asset risk; Z2Score=measure of leverage risk; 
ExcessControl=difference between control and cash-flow rights; ShareRight=dummy equal to one if the anti-director index is lower than 
the median value, and zero otherwise; Crisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2007 or 2008, and zero otherwise; PostCrisis=dummy 
equal to one if the year is 2009 or 2010, and zero otherwise; Log(Assets)=natural logarithm of total assets; Equity=ratio of total equity to 
total assets; Deposits=ratio of customer deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total assets; NNII=ratio of net non-interest 
income to net operating income; CostIncomeRatio=cost to income ratio; Listed=dummy equal to one if the bank is publicly listed, and 
zero otherwise; Rescue=dummy equal to one if the bank was rescued during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and zero otherwise; 
GDPGrowth=real GDP growth rate; CapitalStringency=index of regulatory restrictions on bank capital; OfficialSupervisory=index of 
official supervisory power; Ownership type=set of dummy variables representing the type of the largest ultimate owner (Widely is the 
benchmark group). P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 9: Excess control rights and the change in bank profitability (OLS estimation)  
Y = α	ExcessControl + φX + γZ< + α% + ε,	
	
 Crisis period - pre-crisis period Post-crisis - pre-crisis period  
 DROA DROAR DROA DROAR 
ExcessControl (α 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.832) (0.824) 
Log(Assets) (φ) 0.016 0.017 0.048*** 0.049*** 
 (0.191) (0.178) (0.001) (0.001) 
Equity (φ	) -0.044 -0.045 -0.121*** -0.123*** 
 (0.210) (0.205) (0.007) (0.007) 
Deposits (φ) -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.389) (0.393) (0.111) (0.115) 
Loans (φf) -0.003** -0.003** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
NNII (φj) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
CostIncomeRatio (φk) 0.004** 0.004** 0.004* 0.004* 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.059) (0.059) 
Listed (φl) -0.157** -0.159** -0.233*** -0.236*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) 
Rescue (φm)  0.013 0.014 -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.898) (0.889) (0.912) (0.919) 
Bank (φn) 0.095 0.097 0.050 0.051 
 (0.269) (0.264) (0.610) (0.607) 
Family (φ%) 0.053 0.054 -0.024 -0.024 
 (0.580) (0.583) (0.823) (0.824) 
State (φ) -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.865) (0.862) (0.892) (0.896) 
Institutional (φ	) 0.074 0.074 0.002 0.003 
 (0.454) (0.465) (0.991) (0.983) 
Industry (φ) 0.137 0.138 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.213) (0.214) (0.974) (0.979) 
Foundation (φf) 0.311*** 0.312*** 0.164 0.165 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.199) (0.200) 
GDPGrowth (γ) -0.054** -0.055** -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.636) (0.628) 
RightsProtection (γ	) -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.153*** -0.154*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
CapitalStringency (γ) 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OfficialSupervisory (γf) -0.008 -0.008 -0.020 -0.021 
 (0.503) (0.510) (0.152) (0.144) 
Intercept (α%) -0.170 100.173*** 0.120 99.572*** 
 (0.615) (0.000) (0.731) (0.000) 
Number of Banks 480 480 480  480 
R-Square 0.194 0.196 0.315 0.316 
Variables definition: DROA=change in individual bank profitability defined as DROA = ROA − ROAVVVVVV where ROA is either the crisis or 
post-crisis bank’s return on average assets and ROAVVVVVV is the pre-crisis bank’s return on average assets; DROAR=change in industry-adjusted 
profitability defined as DROAR = %%Tq-./VVVVVVVT-./XYZ[\]^_VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVr	%%Tq-./T	-./WYZ[\]^_r where ROA?s48@5 is either the crisis or post-crisis industry’s return on average 
assets and ROAindustryVVVVVVVVVV is the pre-crisis industry’s return on average assets; ExcessControl=difference between control and cash-flow rights; 
Crisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2007 or 2008, and zero otherwise; PostCrisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2009 or 2010, 
and zero otherwise; Log(Assets)=natural logarithm of total assets; Equity=ratio of total equity to total assets; Deposits=ratio of customer 
deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total assets; NNII=ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income; 
CostIncomeRatio=cost to income ratio; Listed=dummy equal to one if the bank is publicly listed, and zero otherwise; Rescue=dummy 
equal to one if the bank was rescued during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and zero otherwise; Bank-Foundation is a set of dummy 
variables representing the type of the largest ultimate owner (Widely is the benchmark group); GDPGrowth=real GDP growth rate; 
RightsProtection=anti-director index of the level of shareholder protection; CapitalStringency=regulatory capital stringency index; 
OfficialSupervisory=index of official supervisory power. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 10: Nonlinearity in the relationship between excess control rights and bank profitability and risk 
(2002-2010, GLS) 
Y = cαd	ExcessControlQd
f
dg
+ Crisiscβd	ExcessControlQd
f
dg
+ PostCrisiscτd	ExcessControlQd
f
dg
	+ δTDummy 
										+φX + γZ + α% + ε 
Dependent variable (Y)  ROA SDROA ZScore Z1Score Z2Score 
ExcessControlQ1 (α) -0.003 0.065**  -9.089* -0.093 -8.997* 
 (0.958) (0.040) (0.087) (0.846) (0.082) 
ExcessControlQ2 (α	) -0.034 0.078** -13.855** -0.117 -13.738** 
 (0.558) (0.036) (0.042) (0.782) (0.032) 
ExcessControlQ3 (α) -0.205*** 0.090** -20.727***  -0.395* -20.068*** 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.071) (0.000) 
ExcessControlQ4 (αf) -0.315*** 0.092*** -21.024*** -0.877** -20.331*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) 
Crisis× ExcessControlQ1 (β) 0.044 -0.039 0.685 0.072 0.613 
 (0.470) (0.354) (0.874) (0.896) (0.890) 
Crisis× ExcessControlQ2 (β	) 0.125* -0.103**  2.596 0.237 2.359 
 (0.063) (0.021) (0.552) (0.704) (0.572) 
Crisis× ExcessControlQ3 (β) 0.332*** -0.139*** 10.841*  1.024**  9.816*  
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.063) (0.050) (0.066) 
Crisis× ExcessControlQ4 (βf) 0.487*** -0.153*** 13.020**  1.121** 11.899**  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) 
PostCrisis× ExcessControlQ1 (τ) 0.000 -0.019 1.194 0.017 1.177 
 (0.997) (0.618) (0.859) (0.793) (0.863) 
PostCrisis× ExcessControlQ2 (τ	) 0.034  0.021 1.108 0.011 1.097 
 (0.650) (0.515) (0.818) (0.981) (0.812) 
PostCrisis× ExcessControlQ3 (τ) 0.065 0.044 4.714 -0.107 4.821 
 (0.474) (0.272) (0.294) (0.787) (0.281) 
PostCrisis× ExcessControlQ4 (τf) 0.137 0.066 4.200 0.136 4.064 
 (0.415) (0.226) (0.494) (0.343) (0.487) 
Crisis (δ)  -0.183*** 0.039** -4.104**   -0.638** -3.506*  
 (0.000) (0.016) (0.043) (0.019) (0.054) 
PostCrisis (δ	) -0.305*** 0.040** -7.243**   -1.025*** -6.218**  
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.042) (0.000) (0.048) 
Intercept (α%)  2.017*** 0.579*** 49.236*** 3.238*** 45.885*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Control variables (X and Z)  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Number of observations 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 
Number of banks 788 788 788 788 788 
R-square (overall)  0.396 0.206 0.078 0.124 0.080 
Wald tests: α + β 0.041 0.026 -8.404*  -0.021 -8.383*  
                   P-value (0.535) (0.530) (0.088) (0.807) (0.089) 
                   α	 + β	 0.091 -0.025 -11.259**  0.120 -11.379**   
                   P-value (0.182) (0.376) (0.044) (0.614) (0.044) 
                   α + β 0.127*  -0.049* -9.886 0.629 -10.515 
                   P-value (0.064) (0.054) (0.345) (0.163) (0.314) 
                   αf + βf 0.172**  -0.061** -8.004 0.244 -8.248 
                   P-value (0.029) (0.045) (0.340) (0.220) (0.260) 
                   α + τ -0.003 0.046*  -7.895 -0.076 -7.819 
                   P-value (0.972) (0.088) (0.202) (0.724) (0.184) 
                   α	 + τ	 0.000 0.099**  -12.747*  -0.106 -12.641*  
                   P-value (0.933) (0.045) (0.091) (0.872) (0.072) 
                   α + τ -0.127**  0.134** -16.013*** -0.502*  -15.511***  
                   P-value (0.017) (0.036) (0.002) (0.071) (0.000) 
                   αf + τf -0.178***  0.158***  -16.824***  -0.741**  -16.268***  
                   P-value  (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.001) 
Variables definition: ROA=3-year rolling-window mean of the return on average assets; SDROA=3-year rolling-window standard 
deviation of the return on average assets; ZScore=measure of bank default risk; Z1Score=measure of bank asset risk; Z2Score=measure of 
leverage risk; ExcessControlQ1=dummy equal to one if 0<ExcessControl<=Q1, and zero otherwise; ExcessControlQ2=dummy equal to one 
if Q1<ExcessControl<=Q2, and zero otherwise; ExcessControlQ3=dummy equal to one if Q2<ExcessControl<=Q3, and zero otherwise; 
ExcessControlQ4=dummy equal to one if ExcessControl>Q3, and zero otherwise; Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 are respectively the first, second, third 
and fourth quartile of the variable ExcessControl when ExcessControl>0; ExcessControl=difference between control and cash-flow rights; 
Crisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2007 or 2008, and zero otherwise;  PostCrisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2009 or 2010, 
and zero otherwise. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table A1: Correlations among the main explanatory variables used in the regressions  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
ExcessControl (1) 1               
Log(Assets) (2) 0.008 1              
Equity (3) -0.024 -0.527 1             
Deposits (4) -0.077 -0.272 -0.046 1            
Loans (5) -0.049 0.072 -0.118 -0.003 1           
NNII (6) 0.020 -0.122 0.140 0.048 -0.291 1          
CostIncomeRatio (7) -0.050 -0.209 0.061 0.168 -0.062 0.159 1         
Listed (8)  -0.166 0.301 -0.089 0.017 0.162 -0.070 -0.059 1        
Rescue (9) -0.008 0.225 -0.082 -0.077 0.023 -0.053 -0.026 0.140 1       
Crisis (10) 0.000 0.022 -0.023 -0.003 0.023 -0.042 -0.010 -0.015 0.101 1      
PostCrisis (11)  0.006 0.069 -0.024 0.035 -0.006 0.023 0.002 -0.016 0.088 -0.300 1     
GDPGrowth (12)  0.030 -0.026 0.007 -0.015 -0.077 0.055 -0.035 -0.018 -0.052 0.083 -0.542 1    
RightsProtection (13) -0.092 0.032 0.143 -0.047 0.124 -0.136 -0.055 0.097 -0.034 -0.007 -0.012 -0.053 1   
CapitalStringency (14) 0.060 0.009 0.023 -0.081 -0.134 0.095 -0.027 -0.213 -0.070 0.005 0.004 0.050 0.254 1  
OfficialSupervisory (15) -0.001 -0.130 0.121 -0.026 -0.163 0.166 0.024 0.010 0.044 -0.010 0.017 0.123 -0.168 -0.068 1 
Variables definition: ExcessControl=difference between control and cash-flow rights; Log(Assets)=natural logarithm of total assets; 
Equity=ratio of total equity to total assets; Deposits=ratio of total customer deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total assets; 
NNII=ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income; CostIncomeRatio=cost to income ratio; Listed=dummy equal to one if the 
bank is publicly listed, and zero otherwise; Rescue=dummy equal to one if the bank was rescued during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and 
zero otherwise; Crisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2007 or 2008, and zero otherwise; PostCrisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 
2009 or 2010, and zero otherwise; GDPGrowth=real GDP growth rate; RightsProtection=anti-director index of the level of shareholder 
protection; CapitalStringency=regulatory capital stringency index; OfficialSupervisory=index of official supervisory power.  
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Table A2: Excess control rights, bank profitability and risk (2002-2010, GLS): use of country dummies  
 Y = α + α	Crisis+ αPostCrisisExcessControl + δTDummy+φ′X+ γGDPGrowth< + βCountry +	α%+ε 
Dependent variable (Y) ROA SDROA ZScore Z1Score Z2Score 
ExcessControl (α -0.004*** 0.001*** -0.260*** -0.011**  -0.249*** 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) 
Crisis× ExcessControl (α	) 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.130** 0.007**  0.123* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) (0.041) (0.052) 
PostCrisis× ExcessControl (α) 0.001  0.000 0.049 0.004 0.046 
 (0.108) (0.827) (0.326) (0.405) (0.322) 
Crisis (δ) -0.183*** 0.027* -4.535**  -0.474* 4.061* 
 (0.000) (0.068) (0.049) (0.065) (0.052) 
PostCrisis (δ	) -0.303*** 0.042*** -7.011**  -1.099*** -5.912**  
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.036) (0.000) (0.039) 
Log(Assets) (φ) -0.088*** -0.054*** -1.624** 0.193*** -1.803** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.047) (0.001) (0.020) 
Equity (φ	) 0.216*** 0.062*** 4.635*** 0.002 4.599*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.986) (0.007) 
Deposits (φ) 0.002*** -0.000 0.115* 0.020*** 0.098* 
 (0.000) (0.995) (0.058) (0.000) (0.085) 
Loans (φf) 0.000 -0.002*** 0.272*** 0.022*** 0.248*** 
 (0.553) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NNII (φj) 0.002*** 0.000 -0.125*** 0.001 -0.122*** 
 (0.000) (0.343) (0.003) (0.721) (0.002) 
CostIncomeRatio (φk) -0.013*** 0.001*** -0.270*** -0.048*** -0.225*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Listed (φl) 0.154*** 0.037 -11.175** 0.271 -11.443*** 
 (0.001) (0.284) (0.014) (0.500) (0.007) 
Rescue (φm)  0.038 -0.012 -1.958 -0.211 -1.708 
 (0.472) (0.772) (0.715) (0.729) (0.723) 
Bank (φn) 0.045 0.014 -5.963 -0.092 -5.773 
 (0.269) (0.645) (0.295) (0.812) (0.286) 
Family (φ%) 0.050 0.023 -2.961 0.283 -3.047 
 (0.250) (0.439) (0.612) (0.497) (0.580) 
State (φ) 0.046 0.009 -1.801 -0.476 -1.168 
 (0.466) (0.839) (0.799) (0.336) (0.862) 
Institutional (φ	) 0.024 0.014 -3.807 -0.189 -3.488 
 (0.625) (0.692) (0.506) (0.672) (0.515) 
Industry (φ) 0.016 0.073 -5.882 -0.038 -5.790 
 (0.779) (0.122) (0.406) (0.937) (0.386) 
Foundation (φf) 0.038 -0.062 8.939 0.047 8.976 
 (0.575) (0.133) (0.368) (0.943) (0.337) 
GDPG (γ) 0.013*** -0.005** 1.036*** 0.066** 0.969*** 
 (0.000) (0.011) (0.003) (0.020) (0.003) 
Intercept (α%)   2.112*** 0.756*** 96.117*** 5.996*** 89.921*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 
Number of Banks 788 788 788 788 788 
R-Square (overall) 0.424 0.209 0.098 0.153 0.099 
Wald tests : α + α	 0.002** -0.001 -0.130 -0.004 -0.127 
                    P-value  (0.039) (0.124) (0.103) (0.317) (0.126) 
                    α + α -0.003***  0.001**  -0.209***  -0.007 -0.204***  
                    P-value (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.297) (0.000) 
Variables definition: ROA=3-year rolling-window mean of the return on average assets; SDROA=3-year rolling-window standard 
deviation of the return on average assets; ZScore=measure of bank default risk; Z1Score=measure of bank asset risk; Z2Score=measure of 
leverage risk; ExcessControl=difference between control and cash-flow rights; Crisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2007 or 2008, and 
zero otherwise; PostCrisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2009 or 2010, and zero otherwise; Log(Assets)=natural logarithm of total 
assets; Equity=ratio of total equity to total assets; Deposits=ratio of customer deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total 
assets; NNII=ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income; CostIncomeRatio=cost to income ratio; Listed=dummy equal to one 
if the bank is publicly listed, and zero otherwise; Rescue=dummy equal to one if the bank was rescued during the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, and zero otherwise; Bank-Foundation is a set of dummy variables representing the type of the largest ultimate owner (Widely is the 
benchmark group); GDPGrowth=real GDP growth rate. P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A3: Excess control rights, bank profitability and risk (2002-2010, GLS): dependent variables 
computed on the basis of 2-year rolling-window 
Y = α + α	Crisis + αPostCrisisExcessControl + δTDummy+ φX + γZ + α% + ε 
Dependent variable (Y)  ROA SDROA ZScore Z1Score Z2Score 
ExcessControl (α -0.005*** 0.002*** -1.198*** -0.052*** -1.145*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis× ExcessControl (α	) 0.007*** -0.003*** 0.735*** 0.044** 0.689*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.023) (0.001) 
PostCrisis× ExcessControl (α) 0.003*  -0.000 0.115 0.017 0.099 
(0.099) (0.535) (0.467) (0.157) (0.504) 
Crisis (δ) -0.178*** 0.079*** -7.509**  -0.789**  -6.720**  (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.036) (0.024) 
PostCrisis (δ	) -0.282*** 0.016 -5.409 -2.101*** -3.308 
(0.000) (0.295) (0.531) (0.004) (0.663) 
Log(Assets) (φ) -0.101*** -0.046*** -6.134*** 0.252** -6.368*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.046) (0.000) 
Equity (φ	) 0.229*** 0.077*** 7.253 -0.178 7.292 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.128) (0.456) (0.114) 
Deposits (φ) 0.002*** -0.000 0.071 0.038*** 0.036 
(0.000) (0.758) (0.670) (0.000) (0.822) 
Loans (φf) 0.000 -0.001*** 0.863*** 0.054*** 0.808*** 
(0.872) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NNII (φj) 0.002*** 0.001** -0.448*** 0.006 -0.442*** 
(0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.471) (0.000) 
CostIncomeRatio (φk) -0.014*** 0.001** -0.540*** -0.119*** -0.431*** 
(0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Listed (φl) 0.187*** 0.047** -29.902** 0.256 -30.003** 
(0.000) (0.011) (0.039) (0.763) (0.031) 
Rescue (φm)  -0.008 0.018 -20.509 -1.918 -18.377 
(0.866) (0.611) (0.107) (0.201) (0.108) 
Bank (φn) 0.059 -0.001 -23.408 -0.827 -22.126 
(0.147) (0.965) (0.178) (0.384) (0.184) 
Family (φ%) 0.060 0.008 -12.595 0.299 -12.179 
(0.160) (0.729) (0.493) (0.769) (0.489) 
State (φ) -0.065 -0.037 4.311 -0.810 5.657 
(0.281) (0.255) (0.863) (0.541) (0.813) 
Institutional (φ	) 0.054 -0.011 -15.628 -0.920 -14.010 
(0.244) (0.660) (0.414) (0.405) (0.445) 
Industry (φ) 0.060 -0.020 1.942 0.825 1.827 
(0.338) (0.434) (0.928) (0.510) (0.929) 
Foundation (φf) 0.030 -0.039 6.093 -0.094 6.575 
(0.640) (0.219) (0.826) (0.951) (0.803) 
GDPGrowth (γ) 0.012*** -0.005** 3.900*** 0.354*** 3.561** (0.000) (0.037) (0.010) (0.001) (0.012) 
RightsProtection (γ	) 0.002 0.028*** -2.304 0.422 -1.820 
(0.895) (0.000) (0.562) (0.182) (0.636) 
CapitalStringency (γ) -0.017 -0.010* 6.395** 0.364* 6.018** 
(0.118) (0.056) (0.038) (0.055) (0.041) 
OfficialSupervisory (γf) 0.005 0.011** 7.736** 0.103 7.606** 
(0.487) (0.044) (0.017) (0.508) (0.015) 
Intercept (α%) 2.260*** 0.449*** 108.264** 9.156*** 98.623* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.002) (0.061) 
Number of observations 4,476 4,476 4,476 4,476 4,476 
Number of banks 808 808 808 808 808 
R-square (overall) 0.392 0.200 0.057 0.076 0.059 
Wald tests : α + α	 0.002**  -0.001**  -0.463 -0.008 -0.456 
                    P-value  (0.020) (0.015) (0.138) (0.698) (0.129) 
                    α + α -0.002***  0.002***  -1.083***  -0.035***  -1.046***  
                    P-value (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Variables definition: ROA=2-year rolling-window mean of the return on average assets; SDROA=2-year rolling-window standard 
deviation of the return on average assets; ZScore=measure of bank default risk; Z1Score=measure of bank asset risk; Z2Score=measure of 
leverage risk; ExcessControl=difference between control and cash-flow rights; Crisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2007 or 2008, and 
zero otherwise; PostCrisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2009 or 2010, and zero otherwise; Log(Assets)=natural logarithm of total 
assets; Equity=ratio of total equity to total assets; Deposits=ratio of customer deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total 
assets; NNII=ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income; CostIncomeRatio=cost to income ratio; Listed=dummy equal to one 
if the bank is publicly listed, and zero otherwise; Rescue=dummy equal to one if the bank was rescued during the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, and zero otherwise; Bank-Foundation is a set of dummy variables representing the type of the largest ultimate owner (Widely is the 
benchmark group); GDPGrowth=real GDP growth rate; RightsProtection=anti-director index of the level of shareholder protection; 
CapitalStringency=regulatory capital stringency index; OfficialSupervisory=index of official supervisory power. P-values based on robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
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Table A4: Excess control rights, bank profitability and risk: excluding rescued banks (2002-2010, GLS) 
Y = α + α	Crisis + αPostCrisisExcessControl + δTDummy+ φX + γZ + α% + ε 
Dependent variable (Y)  ROA SDROA ZScore Z1Score Z2Score 
ExcessControl (α -0.003*** 0.001**  -0.348***  -0.010**  -0.338***  
(0.005) (0.021) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) 
Crisis× ExcessControl (α	) 0.005*** -0.002*** 0.193**  0.009** 0.184**  
(0.004) (0.000) (0.026) (0.031) (0.038) 
PostCrisis× ExcessControl (α) 0.001 0.000 0.066 0.006 0.060 
(0.473) (0.940) (0.435) (0.408) (0.440) 
Crisis (δ) -0.139*** 0.030* -6.478** -0.815** -5.703** 
(0.000) (0.058) (0.026) (0.011) (0.036) 
PostCrisis (δ	) -0.294*** 0.046*** -8.233**  -1.017*** -7.202**  
(0.000) (0.005) (0.037) (0.000) (0.046) 
Log(Assets) (φ) -0.100*** -0.060*** -1.739* 0.160** -1.882** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.013) (0.028) 
Equity (φ	) 0.216*** 0.065*** 5.102*** 0.004 5.058*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.968) (0.003) 
Deposits (φ) 0.002*** -0.000 0.119* 0.019*** 0.103* 
(0.001) (0.810) (0.065) (0.000) (0.090) 
Loans (φf) 0.001 -0.002*** 0.302*** 0.023*** 0.276*** 
(0.111) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NNII (φj) 0.003*** 0.000 -0.120*** 0.002 -0.117*** 
(0.000) (0.317) (0.004) (0.617) (0.003) 
CostIncomeRatio (φk) -0.013*** 0.001*** -0.251*** -0.046*** -0.208*** 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Listed (φl) 0.209*** 0.048 -19.371*** -0.250 -19.123*** 
(0.000) (0.150) (0.000) (0.520) (0.000) 
Bank (φm) 0.021 0.001 -6.625 -0.216 -6.424 
(0.559) (0.972) (0.186) (0.540) (0.175) 
Family (φn) 0.099** 0.028 -2.983 -0.058 -2.855 
(0.019) (0.352) (0.597) (0.887) (0.589) 
State (φ%) 0.004 0.028 -3.554 -0.531 -3.044 
(0.950) (0.571) (0.658) (0.328) (0.691) 
Institutional (φ) 0.027 -0.026 -3.367 -0.144 -3.199 
(0.524) (0.429) (0.493) (0.642) (0.494) 
Industry (φ	) 0.021 0.087 0.598 0.646 -0.087 
(0.747) (0.170) (0.943) (0.315) (0.991) 
Foundation (φ) 0.028 -0.074 19.005 0.761 18.157 
(0.694) (0.122) (0.101) (0.231) (0.101) 
GDPGrowth (γ) 0.011*** -0.006*** 0.879** 0.060** 0.826** 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.018) (0.036) (0.018) 
RightsProtection (γ	) 0.040*** 0.033*** -1.705 -0.286 -1.391 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.254) (0.112) (0.330) 
CapitalStringency (γ) -0.018 -0.018** 2.805** 0.232** 2.558** 
(0.114) (0.045) (0.016) (0.011) (0.021) 
OfficialSupervisory (γf) 0.005 0.017*** 2.750** 0.042 2.697** 
(0.508) (0.009) (0.021) (0.488) (0.019) 
Intercept (α%) 1.991*** 0.665*** 43.576** 3.364*** 40.135** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.006) (0.021) 
Number of observations 4,230 4,230 4,230 4,230 4,230 
Number of banks 754 754 754 754 754 
R-square (overall) 0.385 0.199 0.069 0.123 0.069 
Wald tests : α + α	 0.002**  -0.001**  -0.155 -0.001 -0.154 
                    P-value  (0.033) (0.012) (0.147) (0.789) (0.160) 
                    α + α -0.002**  0.001**  -0.282***  -0.004 -0.278*** 
                    P-value (0.010) (0.045) (0.000) (0.801) (0.000) 
Variables definition: ROA=3-year rolling-window mean of the return on average assets; SDROA=3-year rolling-window standard 
deviation of the return on average assets; ZScore=measure of bank default risk; Z1Score=measure of bank asset risk; Z2Score=measure of 
leverage risk; ExcessControl=difference between control and cash-flow rights; Crisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2007 or 2008, and 
zero otherwise; PostCrisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2009 or 2010, and zero otherwise; Log(Assets)=natural logarithm of total 
assets; Equity=ratio of total equity to total assets; Deposits=ratio of customer deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total 
assets; NNII=ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income; CostIncomeRatio=cost to income ratio; Listed=dummy equal to one 
if the bank is publicly listed, and zero otherwise; Bank-Foundation is a set of dummy variables representing the type of the largest ultimate 
owner (Widely is the benchmark group); GDPGrowth=real GDP growth rate; RightsProtection=anti-director index of the level of 
shareholder protection; CapitalStringency=regulatory capital stringency index; OfficialSupervisory=index of official supervisory power. P-
values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. 
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Table A5: Excess control rights, bank profitability and risk (2002-2010, GLS): control threshold of 20%  
Y = α + α	Crisis + αPostCrisisExcessControl + δTDummy+ φX + γZ + α% + ε 
Dependent variable (Y)  ROA SDROA ZScore Z1Score Z2Score 
ExcessControl (α -0.003*** 0.001**  -0.332***  -0.012**  -0.320***  
(0.004) (0.016) (0.001) (0.047) (0.004) 
Crisis× ExcessControl (α	) 0.005*** -0.002*** 0.182 0.008** 0.174 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.555) (0.037) (0.649) 
PostCrisis× ExcessControl (α) 0.001 0.000 0.070 0.007 0.064 
(0.420) (0.972) (0.393) (0.305) (0.405) 
Crisis (δ) -0.131*** 0.025* -6.364** -0.833*** -5.568** 
(0.000) (0.097) (0.024) (0.001) (0.034) 
PostCrisis (δ	) -0.283*** 0.044*** -7.145**  -1.032*** -6.101**  
(0.000) (0.004) (0.023) (0.000) (0.026) 
Log(Assets) (φ) -0.101*** -0.056*** -2.036** 0.147** -2.166*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005) 
Equity (φ	) 0.214*** 0.066*** 4.864*** -0.013 4.832*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.886) (0.003) 
Deposits (φ) 0.002*** 0.000 0.101 0.017*** 0.087 
(0.000) (0.925) (0.101) (0.000) (0.135) 
Loans (φf) 0.001 -0.002*** 0.291*** 0.022*** 0.267*** 
(0.139) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NNII (φj) 0.003*** 0.000 -0.101** 0.004 -0.101*** 
(0.000) (0.242) (0.011) (0.231) (0.007) 
CostIncomeRatio (φk) -0.013*** 0.001*** -0.251*** -0.046*** -0.208*** 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Listed (φl) 0.195*** 0.048 -18.856*** -0.342 -18.513*** 
(0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.351) (0.000) 
Rescue (φm)  0.031 -0.010 -3.825 -0.456 -3.326 
(0.570) (0.809) (0.465) (0.442) (0.479) 
Bank (φn) 0.017 0.002 -5.775 -0.175 -5.614 
(0.612) (0.953) (0.222) (0.603) (0.210) 
Family (φ%) 0.096** 0.032 -3.440 -0.116 -3.242 
(0.018) (0.260) (0.519) (0.766) (0.516) 
State (φ) 0.008 0.045 -5.474 -0.723 -4.785 
(0.909) (0.315) (0.459) (0.154) (0.496) 
Institutional (φ	) 0.021 -0.026 -2.474 -0.124 -2.329 
(0.610) (0.414) (0.607) (0.687) (0.611) 
Industry (φ) 0.021 0.086 0.878 0.647 0.196 
(0.752) (0.166) (0.915) (0.307) (0.980) 
Foundation (φf) 0.028 -0.073 18.484* 0.646 17.750* 
(0.679) (0.111) (0.100) (0.292) (0.098) 
GDPGrowth (γ) 0.013*** -0.005*** 0.956*** 0.076*** 0.886*** 
(0.000) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
RightsProtection (γ	) 0.043*** 0.031*** -1.447 0.234 -1.185 
(0.003) (0.008) (0.316) (0.135) (0.390) 
CapitalStringency (γ) -0.019* -0.018** 3.141*** 0.234*** 2.892*** 
(0.071) (0.031) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
OfficialSupervisory (γf) 0.005 0.019*** 2.528** 0.032 2.486** 
(0.535) (0.004) (0.030) (0.587) (0.027) 
Intercept (α%) 2.002*** 0.606*** 44.271** 3.405*** 40.802** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.005) (0.017) 
Number of observations 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 4,451 
Number of banks 788 788 788 788 788 
R-square (overall) 0.386 0.199 0.067 0.121 0.068 
Wald tests : α + α	 0.002** -0.001***  -0.150 -0.004 -0.146 
                    P-value  (0.039) (0.007) (0.167) (0.316) (0.184) 
                    α + α -0.002**  0.001**  -0.263***   -0.005 -0.256***  
                    P-value (0.019) (0.026) (0.005) (0.286) (0.006) 
Variables definition: ROA=3-year rolling-window mean of the return on average assets; SDROA=3-year rolling-window standard 
deviation of the return on average assets; ZScore=measure of bank default risk; Z1Score=measure of bank asset risk; Z2Score=measure of 
leverage risk; ExcessControl=difference between control and cash-flow rights; Crisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2007 or 2008, and 
zero otherwise; PostCrisis=dummy equal to one if the year is 2009 or 2010, and zero otherwise; Log(Assets)=natural logarithm of total 
assets; Equity=ratio of total equity to total assets; Deposits=ratio of customer deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total 
assets; NNII=ratio of net non-interest income to net operating income; CostIncomeRatio=cost to income ratio; Listed=dummy equal to one 
if the bank is publicly listed, and zero otherwise; Rescue=dummy equal to one if the bank was rescued during the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, and zero otherwise; Bank-Foundation is a set of dummy variables representing the type of the largest ultimate owner (Widely is the 
benchmark group); GDPGrowth=real GDP growth rate; RightsProtection=anti-director index of the level of shareholder protection; 
CapitalStringency=regulatory capital stringency index; OfficialSupervisory=index of official supervisory power. P-values based on robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table A6: Excess control rights, bank profitability and risk (GLS): regressions on subsamples 
Y = αExcessControl + φX + γZ + δYear + α% + ε 
 Pre-crisis period (2002-2006) Crisis period (2007-2008) Post-crisis period (2009-2010) 
Dependent variable (Y) ROA SDROA ZScore Z1Score Z2Score ROA SDROA ZScore Z1Score Z2Score ROA SDROA ZScore Z1Score Z2Score 
ExcessControl (α -0.004*** 0.001** -0.282*** -0.008*  -0.271*** 0.001**  -0.001* -0.087 0.012 -0.100 -0.003*** 0.001**  -0.297*** -0.002 -0.295*** 
 (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.049) (0.056) (0.362) (0.134) (0.265) (0.000) (0.046) (0.000) (0.758) (0.000) 
Log(Assets) (φ) -0.111*** -0.052*** -2.456*** 0.139** -2.607*** -0.084*** -0.062*** -1.089 0.379*** -1.468 -0.059*** -0.059*** -4.145*** -0.101 -4.042*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.041) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.318) (0.000) (0.152) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.245) (0.000) 
Equity (φ	) 0.198*** 0.097*** 1.160 -0.156 1.264 0.287*** 0.109*** 12.039*** 0.128 11.909*** 0.164*** 0.107*** 4.024 -0.248 4.289 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.572) (0.197) (0.519) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.425) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.193) (0.103) (0.153) 
Deposits (φ) 0.003*** -0.000 0.013 0.013** 0.003 0.002** -0.001 0.179** 0.029*** 0.149* 0.003*** -0.001 0.137 0.030*** 0.107 
 (0.000) (0.744) (0.878) (0.031) (0.969) (0.029) (0.320) (0.050) (0.000) (0.084) (0.000) (0.288) (0.202) (0.000) (0.289) 
Loans (φf) 0.001 -0.001* 0.225*** 0.021*** 0.204** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.407*** 0.030*** 0.378*** -0.002*** -0.001* 0.408*** 0.016** 0.392*** 
 (0.379) (0.077) (0.008) (0.000) (0.011) (0.641) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.092) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) 
NNII (φj) 0.004*** 0.001** -0.148*** 0.005 -0.149*** 0.003*** 0.000 -0.282*** 0.007 -0.285*** 0.002** 0.002*** -0.281*** -0.002 -0.278*** 
 (0.000) (0.039) (0.009) (0.257) (0.005) (0.002) (0.656) (0.001) (0.286) (0.000) (0.034) (0.010) (0.000) (0.745) (0.000) 
CostIncomeRatio (φk) -0.012*** 0.001 -0.171*** -0.036*** -0.139** -0.011*** 0.001** -0.343*** -0.065*** -0.280*** -0.013*** 0.002*** -0.306*** -0.067*** -0.240*** 
 (0.000) (0.167) (0.005) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.008) 
Listed (φl) 0.243*** 0.023 -14.731*** -0.195 -14.479*** 0.135** 0.058* -19.504*** 0.524 -20.016*** -0.027 0.063* -28.199*** -1.231** -26.980*** 
 (0.000) (0.476) (0.003) (0.619) (0.002) (0.012) (0.096) (0.001) (0.349) (0.000) (0.589) (0.069) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) 
Rescue (φm) - - - - - -0.029 0.091 -11.541 -0.612 -10.920 0.029 0.082 -8.354 -0.756 -7.604 
     (0.666) (0.206) (0.190) (0.529) (0.176) (0.749) (0.217) (0.359) (0.271) (0.374) 
GDPGrowth (γ) 0.024*** -0.014** 1.929*** 0.317*** 1.613*** 0.078*** -0.000 1.856** 0.339*** 1.509* 0.005* -0.007*** 0.575 -0.007 0.581 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.904) (0.032) (0.000) (0.058) (0.079) (0.002) (0.190) (0.824) (0.159) 
RightsProtection (γ	) 0.078*** 0.024* -1.945 -0.248 -1.571 0.055** 0.004 1.485 0.354** 1.127 0.043  0.027* -4.384** -0.233 -4.151** 
 (0.000) (0.067) (0.266) (0.108) (0.345) (0.014) (0.748) (0.503) (0.037) (0.593) (0.200) (0.067) (0.025) (0.001) (0.036) 
CapitalStringency (γ) -0.037*** -0.016* 2.979** 0.207** 2.768** -0.022 -0.006 1.764 0.005 1.755 0.010 -0.014 2.289 0.310** 1.971 
 (0.003) (0.089) (0.019) (0.031) (0.021) (0.105) (0.408) (0.229) (0.972) (0.202) (0.470) (0.138) (0.135) (0.016) (0.169) 
OfficialSupervisory (γf) 0.009 0.017** 2.653** 0.021 2.634** -0.002 0.005 2.149 0.007 2.132* -0.017* 0.019** 2.495* -0.077 2.568* 
 (0.373) (0.011) (0.036) (0.760) (0.030) (0.822) (0.490) (0.109) (0.942) (0.095) (0.089) (0.034) (0.086) (0.360) (0.064) 
Intercept (α%) 2.003*** 0.568*** 55.161*** 3.320** 51.747*** 1.694*** 0.847*** 42.787* 1.563 41.395* 1.981*** 0.506*** 90.751*** 7.465*** 83.320*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.022) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.447) (0.082) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Ownership type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies (Year) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,396 2,396 2,396 2,396 2,396 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,051 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,004 
Number of banks 708 708 708 708 708 620 620 620 620 620 593 593 593 593 593 
R-square (overall) 0.424 0.210 0.062 0.090 0.065 0.408 0.314 0.121 0.174 0.124 0.313 0.227 0.142 0.181 0.143 
Variables definition: ROA=3-year rolling-window mean of the return on average assets; SDROA=3-year rolling-window standard deviation of the return on average assets; ZScore=measure of 
bank default risk; Z1Score=measure of bank asset risk; Z2Score=measure of leverage risk; ExcessControl=difference between control and cash-flow rights; Log(Assets)=natural logarithm of 
total assets; Equity=ratio of total equity to total assets; Deposits=ratio of customer deposits to total assets; Loans=ratio of net loans to total assets; NNII=ratio of net non-interest income to net 
operating income; CostIncomeRatio=cost to income ratio; Listed=dummy equal to one if the bank is publicly listed, and zero otherwise; Rescue=dummy equal to one if the bank was rescued 
during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and zero otherwise; GDPGrowth=real GDP growth rate; RightsProtection=anti-director index of the level of shareholder protection; 
CapitalStringency=regulatory capital stringency index; OfficialSupervisory=index of official supervisory power; Ownership type=set of dummy variables representing the type of the largest 
ultimate owner (Widely is the benchmark group). P-values based on robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
